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Chapter 1: Efficient Design of an Auction with Discrete Bid Levels
This paper studies one of auction design issues: the choice of bid levels. Full effi-
ciency is generally unachievable with a discrete auction. Since there may be more
than one bidder who submits the same bid, the auction cannot completely sort
bidders by valuation. In effort to maximize efficiency, the social planner tries to
choose the partition rule—a rule dictating how type space is partitioned to group
bidders who submit the same bid together-to maximize efficiency. With the effi-
cient partition rule, we implement bid levels with sealed-bid and clock auctions.
We find that the efficient bid levels in the sealed-bid second-price auction may be
assigned non-unique bid amounts and efficient bid increments in a clock auction
with highest-rejected bid may be decreasing. We also show that revealing demand
is efficiency-enhancing even in the independent private valuation setting where price
discovery is not important.
Chapter 2: Pricing Rule in a Clock Auction
We analyze a discrete clock auction with lowest-accepted bid (LAB) pricing and
provisional winners, as adopted by India for its 3G spectrum auction. In a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium, the provisional winner shades her bid while provisional losers
do not. Such differential shading leads to inefficiency. An auction with highest-
rejected bid (HRB) pricing and exit bids is strategically simple, has no bid shading,
and is fully efficient. In addition, it has higher revenues than the LAB auction,
assuming profit maximizing bidders. The bid shading in the LAB auction exposes
a bidder to the possibility of losing the auction at a price below the bidder’s value.
Thus, a fear of losing at profitable prices may cause bidders in the LAB auction to bid
more aggressively than predicted assuming profit-maximizing bidders. We extend
the model by adding an anticipated loser’s regret to the payoff function. Revenue
from the LAB auction yields higher expected revenue than the HRB auction when
bidders’ fear of losing at profitable prices is sufficiently strong. This would provide
one explanation why India, with an expressed objective of revenue maximization,
adopted the LAB auction for its upcoming 3G spectrum auction, rather than the
seemingly superior HRB auction.
Chapter 3: Discrete Clock Auctions: An Experimental Study
We analyze the implications of different pricing rules in discrete clock auctions. The
two most common pricing rules are highest-rejected bid (HRB) and lowest-accepted
bid (LAB). Under HRB, the winners pay the lowest price that clears the market;
under LAB, the winners pay the highest price that clears the market. Both the
HRB and LAB auctions maximize revenues and are fully efficient in our setting.
Our experimental results indicate that the LAB auction achieves higher revenues.
This also is the case in a version of the clock auction with provisional winners.
This revenue result may explain the frequent use of LAB pricing. On the other
hand, HRB is successful in eliciting true values of the bidders both theoretically and
experimentally.
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Auctions have long been used to trade a variety of goods ranging from collectibles
to agricultural products. In the past few decades, governments around the world
have been sold publicly-owned assets such as spectrum licenses, carbon permits and
offshore oil leases through auctions. Auctions have become more common among
individuals since the emergence of internet auction websites where virtually any
seller can put an item for sale and buyers can browse through a list of auctioned
items. It is undeniable that auctions have become one of the important economic
institutions. Undoubtedly, the design of auctions has gained attention from both
academics and practitioners.
Bidding behavior depends on an auction format and so does the auction out-
come. An auction designer primary role is to tailor auction rules so that the out-
come aligns with the auction objective. Typical auction objectives are revenue and
efficiency. On one hand, an auction house may focus on maximizing the auction
revenue. The auctioneer may set a reserve price that might effectively hinder the
efficient allocation (Riley & Samuelson, 1981; Myerson, 1981). The well-known rev-
enue equivalence principle asserts that any standard auction format that allocates
the good in similar manner generates the same expected revenue. On the other
hand, a government who sells a publicly-owned asset to the private sector typically
put an emphasis on allocative efficiency—the good is awarded to the one who values
it most. Theoretically, any standard auction format—an auction that awards the
good to the one who submits the highest bid—yields the efficient allocation. Since
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equilibrium bidding strategy is a one-to-one monotonic mapping from valuation, any
standard auction will automatically award the good to the highest-valuation bidder.
The classic auction theory seemingly suggests that a choice of auction is irrele-
vant since any standard auction yields an efficient allocation and the same expected
revenue. However, a relaxation of some assumption may make such desirable out-
come deviate from the prediction. For example, Milgrom and Weber (1982) show
that English and second-price auctions are no longer equivalent if valuations are
interdependent as price discovery become relevant. Holt (1980) argues that the rev-
enue of the first-price auction is greater than that of the second-price auction when
bidders are risk-averse. Vickrey (1961) states that with asymmetric bidders, the
revenue ranking between the first-price and second-price auctions are ambiguous
and the allocation of the first-price auction may be inefficient. Che and Gale (1998)
show that if bidders face budget constraints, the first-price auction is more efficient
and yields higher expected revenue than the second-price auction.
While most auction literature assumes continuous bidding, most auctions in
the real world are conducted in discrete manner. Conceptually, a discrete sealed-bid
auction allows bidders to submit only bids chosen from a finite set of bid amounts. In
the extreme case, bid amounts are restricted to the smallest currency unit. Discrete
English auction requires bid amounts to meet a certain minimum which is a discrete
jump from the previous round price. A clock price in a discrete clock auction is
the previous clock price plus one discrete bid increment. Discrete bidding rounds in
dynamic auctions are desirable in practice because of their robustness to commu-
nication failures and properties that mitigate tacit collusion (Ausubel & Cramton,
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2004). Real-world examples of auctions with discrete bid levels are the spectrum
auctions in US, Germany, Norway and so on. In these auctions, minimum allowable
bid is implemented. In eBay auction, discrete bid increment varies depending on
the current price. The relaxation of continuous bid space brings in an unexplored
area of auction design. One of the implications of discrete auction is that the full ef-
ficiency is unattainable with a discrete bid levels. While the symmetric equilibrium
bid function in the continuous case is one-to-one monotonic mapping from valua-
tion, the symmetric equilibrium bid function in a discrete auction is many-to-one
mapping since the number of possible valuations is greater than the number of bid
levels. Particularly, there may be one or more bidder who submits the same bid and
the auctioneer will treat them similarly. If another bidder submits the same bid as
the highest-valuation bidder and wins the tie breaker, the allocation is inefficient.
For example, consider the first-price sealed-bid auction with continuous bid
space and the one with ten bid levels. Suppose there are two bidders whose valua-
tions are independently and uniformly distributed between the interval [0,1]. Figure
1 shows the equilibrium bid function in continuous (dashed) and discrete (solid)
cases. When bidders are allowed to submit any real number, the bid function is de-
fined B(x)=x/2 where x is valuation. If bidders are allowed to submit bid amounts
chosen from a set of ten bid amounts, the equilibrium bid function is a step function.
Bidders whose valuations are in the same domain of a step will submit the same bid
amount. For instance, if a bidder with valuation of 0.71 and another with valuation
of 0.77 will submit the same bid of 0.37. The auctioneer therefore randomly assigns
the item to one of them. The auctioneer may misassign the item to the one with
iv
Figure 1: Bid functions in continuous (dashed) and discrete (solid) cases.
valuation 0.71 if she wins the tiebreaker.
In Chapter 1, we derive the maximum attainable efficiency of the standard
auction mechanism given the number of bid levels and develop an approach to
determine a set of bid levels that achieve such level of efficiency. The efficient
discrete auction mechanism can be implemented in various auction formats.
In Chapter 2 and 3, we study a choice of pricing rule in a discrete clock auction.
Clock auction is one of the most popular dynamic auctions and it has been used
to sell commodities such as gas, electricity, spectrum right, carbon permit, and so
on. With discrete bid levels, the pricing rule in an clock auction becomes relevant.
While a continuous clock auction yields a unique market clearing price—the price
where the marginal bidder drops out, there can be more than one market clearing
prices in a discrete clock auction. For example, consider a clock auction where one
item is being sold to two bidders (see Figure 2). At a price of 50, both bidders bid
but at the price of 60, one bidder drops out and the other bidder bids. Obviously,
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Figure 2: A clock auction with two bidders and one item for sale.
60 is one of the market clearing prices but any price between 50 and 60 can also
clear the market. Each pricing rule elicits different bidding behavior and yields
different outcome. Chapter 2 and 3 thus compare revenue and efficiency of various
pricing rules in a discrete clock auction. The former provides a theoretical prediction
whereas the latter shows an experiment evidence.
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Chapter 1
Efficient Design of an Auction with Discrete Bid Levels
1.1 Introduction
Auctions have been predominantly used by governments to sell a wide range
of goods such as spectrum licenses, electricity, treasury bills and emission rights.
Typically, a government would aim to allocate the good to those who value it most.
Although auctions have been regarded as efficient selling mechanisms in literatures,
designing efficient auctions is still an immense challenge. Some design issues have
been cleared up but others remain unresolved (Cramton, 2009). One issue that has
received little attention so far is the choice of discrete bid levels.
While most auction models have assumed that bidders can submit any bid
chosen from a continuous interval, bid amounts are normally restricted to discrete
bid levels in practice. For example, FCC’s AWS and 700 MHz required that a valid
bid amount must exceed a designated minimum acceptable bid-one bid increment
plus the standing high bid. In the India 3G spectrum auction, a bid increment is a
fraction of the previous clock price. Ausubel and Cramton (2004) stated that the
motivation for discrete bid levels, as opposed to a continuous increment, is their
robustness to communication failure and facilitation of the price discovery. Discrete
bidding rounds give bidders time to fix communication issues and incorporate in-
formation revealed throughout the auction into their valuation models and bidding
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strategies.
Despite the practicality of discrete bidding, full efficiency is generally unattain-
able. Efficiency of the traditional auction model hinges on its ability to sort bidders
by valuation. Since a bid function is a one-to-one monotonic mapping from valua-
tion, any standard auction mechanism-an auction that awards the item to the bidder
who submitted the highest bid-is fully efficient. On the other hand, a discrete auc-
tion can be perceived as a selling mechanism whose message space is a finite set.
The type and message spaces are no longer isomorphic. A group of bidders with
different valuations may submit the same message. The mechanism cannot rank
these bidders and thereby assign them the same probability of trade and expected
payment. At worst, the mechanism may misassign the item to another bidder who
submits the same message as the highest-valuation bidder.
This paper develops a framework for determining bid levels that maximize
efficiency in a single-item auction. In a symmetric equilibrium, the type space can
be partitioned into segments such that bidders with valuations within the same
segment follow the same bidding strategy. The social planner’s problem is to choose
a partition rule to maximize efficiency. We employ a mechanism with finite message
space to determine the efficient partition rule for static auction. The framework is
also applicable to a blind clock auction which is equivalent to a sealed-bid auction.
We use a different approach for a dynamic auction with demand disclosure. We
find that in a two-bidder case, the efficient partition is finer where a valuation is
more likely to lie. With more than two bidders whose valuations are uniformly
distributed, the higher segments become smaller.
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The efficient partition rule can be implemented with bid levels in many dis-
crete auction formats. In the sealed-bid first-price auction, efficient bid levels are
strictly increasing whereas in the second-price auction, bid amounts may be non-
unique. We demonstrate numerically that with two bidders whose valuations are
uniformly distributed, the efficiencies of an efficient discrete auction and an auction
with naively-chosen bid levels converge to the full efficiency level as the number of
messages increases but the latter’s rate of convergence is slower. The efficient bid
levels in a clock auction with demand disclosure and highest-rejected bid can be
either increasing or decreasing. One of our key results is that revealing demand
improves efficiency even in the independent private valuation setting in which price
discovery is irrelevant.
Several papers analyzed bidding behavior in discrete auctions. Chwe (1989)
and Mathews and Sengupta (2008) examined the first-price and second-price sealed-
bid discrete auctions, respectively. Cramton and Sujarittanonta (2010) compared
performances of various pricing rules in ascending clock auctions with discrete bid
increments. They also studied clock auctions in which intraround bidding is permit-
ted. Another branch of literature that is closely related to our paper studied optimal
discrete bid levels. Rothkopf and Harstad (1994) determined a set of optimal dis-
crete bid levels in an English auction. David et al. (2007) extended the model of
Rothkopf and Harstad and found that decreasing bid increments maximize revenue.
In contrast to these works, our approach is not specific to any auction format. A
few paper studied a mechanism design with a restriction on action space similar
to our model. Blumrosen and Feldman (2006) characterized sufficient conditions
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for dominant-strategy implementability in a mechanism analogous to our model.
Blumrosen, Nisan, and Segal (2007) studied an optimal mechanism with bounded
action space.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, we outline a
mechanism with finite message space which will be used in designing the efficient
static auction. We derive an efficient auction mechanism with finite message space
in Section 1.3. Then, we implement the mechanism with sealed-bid and blind clock
auctions in Section 1.4. In Section 1.5, we design an efficient clock auction with
demand disclosure. Conclusion and discussion of future works are in Section 1.6.
Missing proofs are presented in Appendix A.
1.2 Mechanism with Finite Message Space
There is one indivisible item for sale. A set of I bidders is denoted by I =
{1, 2, . . . , I}. The seller values the item at x0 = 0. Bidder i’s private valuation is
denoted by xi ∈ Xi where Xi ≡ [xi, xi] ∈ R+ is bidder i’s type space and xi ≥ x0 for
all i ∈ I. Bidder i’s valuation xi is distributed according to a probability distribution
Fi with associated density function fi with a support Xi. Bidder i’s expected payoff
is xiqi − ti where qi is the probability that bidder i obtains the item and ti is the
payment made to the seller by bidder i.
LetMi ≡ {mi0,mi1, . . . ,mi,Mi−1} be a finite set of messages available to bidder
i where Mi is the number of messages. The vector of the numbers of messages
M ≡ (M1,M2, . . . ,MI) is exogenously given. Note that the messages space is not
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necessary orderable. For example, the message space can be {red, green, blue} where
each message corresponds with different probability of trade and expected payment.
However, it is a common practice to name a message with an associated bid amount.
All bidders learn their types and submit reports chosen from their message
spaces to the mechanism simultaneously. Let r ≡ (r1, r2, . . . , rI) be a vector of
reports where ri ∈ Mi is bidder i’s report. The mechanism with finite message
space can be defined as follows.
Definition 1.1. A mechanism with finite message space 〈Q,T〉 consists of a pair of
functions: (1) allocation rule Q :M→ [0, 1]I where
∑
i∈I Qiri ≤ 1 and (2) payment
rule T :M→ RI .
In contrast to the traditional selling mechanism, allocation and payment rules
are mappings from a finite set instead of a compact interval into outcomes. If bidder
i reports ri and others report r−i, bidder i’s expected payoff is
Ui(ri, r−i) = xiQi(ri, r−i)− Ti(ri, r−i)
We can define a direct mechanism with finite message space as follows.
Definition 1.2. Define a partition rule as µ : X → M. Direct mechanism with
finite message space, 〈Q̃, T̃〉 ≡ 〈Q,T,µ〉, consists of a pair of composite functions:
(1) direct allocation rule Q̃ = Q ◦ µ and (2) direct payment rule T̃ = T ◦ µ.
There exists a direct mechanism with finite message space 〈Q̃, T̃〉 such that, in an
equilibrium, each bidder reports her type truthfully and the outcome is identical to
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that of a mechanism with finite message space 〈Q,T〉.
The direct mechanism with finite message space should not be confused with
the traditional direct mechanism. Although bidders report their valuations truth-
fully, the valuations are first mapped into messages via the partition rule µ and
then these messages will be used to determine the outcome. The mechanism cannot
handle the valuations directly.
If bidder i reports zi and others report x−i, bidder i’s expected payoff is
Ũi(zi,x−i) = xiQi(µi(zi),µ−i(x−i))− Ti(µi(zi),µ−i(x−i))
= xiQ̃i(zi,x−i)− T̃i(zi,x−i)









incentive compatibility condition is characterized in Definition 1.3 and its implica-
tion is discussed in Proposition 1.1.
Definition 1.3. The direct mechanism with finite message space is (Bayesian) in-
centive compatible if and only if ũi(xi) ≥ q̃i(zi)xi− t̃i(zi) for all zi ∈Mi, xi ∈ Xi and
i ∈ I where ũi(xi) ≡ q̃i(xi)xi − t̃i(xi) is the equilibrium payoff function. Moreover,
the incentive compatibility implies that ũi(xi) = maxzi∈Xi q̃i(zi)xi − t̃i(zi).
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Proposition 1.1. If a direct mechanism with finite message space 〈Q,T,µ〉 is
incentive compatible, all i ∈ I, q̃i(xi) is non-decreasing in xi. Specifically, for
mis,mit ∈ Mi, α, β ∈ Xi and α > β, qi(mis) ≥ qi(mit) where µi(α) = mis,
µi(β) = mit and s 6= t.
Proposition simply states that in an incentive compatible mechanism, a bidder
with higher valuation will report a message with higher priority. The partition rule in
a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism is equivalent to a Bayesian equilibrium
strategy profile.
Proposition 1.2. If a direct mechanism 〈Q,T,µ〉 is incentive compatible, the ex-
pected payment is, for all xi ∈ Xi and i ∈ I,




(Revenue Equivalence Principle) The expected payments in two incentive compat-
ible mechanisms with finite message space are equivalent up to a constant if their
allocation and partition rules are identical.
In the traditional mechanism design, identical allocation rules imply revenue
equivalence. In contrast, the expected payment in a mechanism with finite mes-
sage space depends on both allocation and partition rules that together determine
the actual allocation. Two distinct standard auction formats with the same set of
bid levels does not imply revenue equivalence since bidding behavior, and thereby
partition rule, may be different.
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To simplify the analysis without loss of generality, we reorder messages such
that a message with a higher index number yields a higher probability of trade.
Definition 1.4. An ordered finite message space is a message space M such that
qi(mij) ≥ qi(mik) for all i ∈ I and j > k. Without loss of generality, any message
space can be re-indexed into an ordered finite message space.
Proposition 1.3. Consider an incentive compatible direct mechanism with ordered
finite message space 〈Q,T,µ〉. A partition rule µ is characterized by a partition
vector x̂i ≡ (x̂i0, x̂i1, . . . , x̂iMi) for all i ∈ I such that if xi ∈ [x̂ij, x̂i,j+1), µi(xi) = mij
where j = 0, 1, . . . ,Mi − 1, x̂i0 = xi, xiMi = xi and µi(xi) = mi,Mi−1. Therefore,
q̃i(xi) is a non-decreasing step function with Mi steps such that the k-th step lies
upon the interval [x̂i,k−1, x̂ik) with the step height of qi(mi,k−1) and the height at xi
is qi(mi,Mi−1).
The partition vector divides the type space into a number of convex segments.
Bidders whose valuations lie within the same segment will submit the same message
and thereby obtain the same probability of trade. Thus, the probability of trade in
each segment is a constant function constituting a step with a size of the segment.
Since the incentive compatibility implies that a bidder with higher valuation prefers
a higher-priority message, the probability of trade can be represented as a non-
decreasing step function.
To state Proposition 1.3 differently, a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium of an
incentive compatible mechanism with ordered finite message space 〈Q,T〉 is fully
characterized by the partition rule. If xi ∈ [x̂ij, x̂i,j+1), bidder i submits a message
8
Figure 1.1: Expected utility, probability of trade and expected payment
in a mechanism with ordered finite message space.
mij. A partition x̂ij can be interpreted as a valuation of the bidder who is indifferent
between reporting mi,j−1 and mij. We however assume that she always submits the
higher-priority message.
Given the allocation and partition rules, the payment rule can be rewritten as
shown in Proposition 1.4.
Proposition 1.4. The expected payment in an incentive compatible mechanism with








Bidder i’s expected utility, probability of trade and expected payment are
shown in Figure 1.1. The expected utility is a convex function with a kink at each
partition. The slope of expected utility (Figure 1.1 left) which is equal to the prob-
ability of trade (Figure 1.1 right) is constant within each segment. The expected
payment when reporting mj is the intersection between the areas above the proba-
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bility of trade function and below the horizontal line with the Y -coordinate equal
to qi(mj). The intersection within the segment associated with the report is empty
since the probability of trade function is also horizontal. Therefore, the expected
payment is the area the intersection between the areas above the probability of trade
function and below the horizontal line with the Y -coordinate equal to qi(mj−1) as
shown in the shaded area in Figure 1.1.
1.3 Efficient Auction Mechanism with Finite Message Space
By the nondiscriminatory characteristics of an auction, all message spaces are
identical. Specifically, Mi = M ≡ {m0,m1, . . . ,mM−1} for all i ∈ I. In addition,
the allocation rules as well as payment rules are the same for all bidders. That
is, Qi(r) = Q(ri, r−i), Ti(r) = T (ri, r−i), qi(ri) = q(ri) and ti(ri) = t(ri) for all
i ∈ I and ri ∈ M. To simplify the analysis, we assume that bidders are ex ante
symmetric. That is, for all i ∈ I, bidder i’s valuation is independently distributed
on the interval [x, x] with associated distribution function F and density function f .
The partition vector is redefined as x̂ = (x̂0, x̂1, . . . , x̂M) where x̂0 = x and x̂M = x.
The partition vector is universal to all bidders. If xi ∈ [x̂j, x̂j+1), µ(xi) = mj.
In an ordered finite message space, a message with a higher index num-
ber implies a higher priority. Therefore, define a priority function S : M →
{0, 1, . . . ,M−1} such that S(mj) = j. The allocation rule of the symmetric auction
mechanism with finite message space is defined as follows.
Definition 1.5. A symmetric auction mechanism with ordered finite message space
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is a feasible and incentive compatible mechanism with ordered finite message space
〈Q,T〉 where Q :MI → [0, 1]I and T :MI → RI such that for every r ∈MI ,
Qi(r) ≡ Q(ri, r−i) =

0 if S(ri) < maxj 6=i S(rj)
1 if S(ri) > maxj 6=i S(rj)
1
k
if S(ri) = maxj 6=i S(rj)
where the number of bidders who submits the message with the highest priority k =∣∣{rl|S(rl) = maxj∈I S(rj) and l ∈ I}∣∣
The mechanism allocates the item to the bidder who submits the highest-
priority message. If there is a tie, the item is awarded randomly to one of the high
bidders. With the predetermined allocation rule, we can define the probability of
trade and expected payment as follows.
Proposition 1.5. Consider an auction mechanism with ordered finite message space
〈Q,T〉. For each mj ∈ M, the probability of trade and expected payment1 when
reporting mj are


























F (x̂j+1)− F (x̂j)
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K|K ⊂ I \ {i} and |K| = k
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be a set of all possible set of k bidders. Without the
assumption of ex ante symmetric bidders, bidder i’s probability of trade and expected payment
are, for each mj ∈ M, q(mj) =
∏


































The first term in the probability of trade is a probability that all bidders
except bidder i submit messages with a priority lower than mj. The second term is
a summation of probability that k bidders submit mj and I − k− 1 bidders submit
messages with a priority lower than mj for k = 1, 2, . . . , I − 1. In this case, bidder i
wins the tiebreaker with probability of 1/(k + 1). The expected payment is similar
to the one in Proposition 1.4 except that the messages are not bidder-specific.
The social planner’s objective is to maximize efficiency. We consider an ex-
pected gain from trade as the social-choice function2 defined as follows,
Φ(x, r) = x ·Q(r)
The social-choice function is implementable in a dominant strategy since the suffi-
cient conditions as characterized in Corollary 1 in Blumrosen and Feldman (2006)
are satisfied. That is, the valuation function, vi(xi, r) ≡ xiQi(r), is single crossing
and linear in xi for all i ∈ I and r ∈M.
Since the allocation rule is predetermined, the ex ante expected gain from
2An alternative social-choice function is a probability that the allocation is inefficient. One
criticism for this social-choice function is that it ignores the magnitude of the loss in gain from
trade.
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F (x̂j+1)− F (x̂j)
The equation is the sum of the probability that the highest valuation is in [x̂j, x̂j+1)
multiplied by the expected highest valuation. The expected gain from trade depends
only on the partition rule. Proposition 1.6 is immediately follows.
Proposition 1.6. (Efficiency Equivalence Principle) Any two standard auctions
with the same partition rule are equally efficient.
The social planner problem is to choose the partition rule that maximize the
social-choice function. Specifically, the social planner’s problem is maxx̂∈X ϕ(x̂)
subject to x = x̂0 ≤ x̂1 ≤ · · · ≤ x̂M = x. A partition vector can be derived by
solving M + 1 equations, ∇ϕ = 0, for M + 1 unknowns x̂. Proposition states the
relationship between efficiency and the number of bid levels.
Proposition 1.7. Efficiency of an auction with discrete bid levels is weakly increas-
ing in the number of messages.
The social planner’s problem is basically an optimization with a constrained
choice set. The optimization problem with M messages is equivalent to the one with
M + 1 messages where one of constraints is x̂M−1 = x̂M . If this constraint is relaxed


















E[x|x ∈ [x̂j , x̂j+1)]
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by permitting an additional message, the higher value of the social-choice function
can be achieved. As the number of messages increases, the expected gain from trade
becomes higher. If there are an infinite number of messages, the partition rule maps
valuation into itself. Thus, the mechanism is able to sort bidders directly by their
valuations and separate the bidder with highest valuation from others. The outcome
is therefore fully efficient.
By differentiating the expected gain from trade with respect to each partition,
we can derive the first-order conditions given in Proposition 1.8.
Proposition 1.8. Efficient partition vector x̂ satisfies, for j = 0, 1, . . . ,M − 1,
IF (x̂j)
I−1(E(x|x ∈ [x̂j, x̂j+1))− E(x|x ∈ [x̂j−1, x̂j)) =
λ(x̂j−1, xj)
(




E(x|x ∈ [x̂j, xj+1))− x̂j
)
where λ(a, b) = F (b)
I−F (a)I
F (b)−F (a) if b > a and zero otherwise.
Instead of analyzing the first-order condition directly, we make further as-
sumptions in Corollary 1.1 and Corollary 1.2 to gain insights into characteristics of
the efficient partitions.
Corollary 1.1. If valuations are uniformly distributed, the efficient partition vector






for j = 1, 2, . . . ,M − 1. When there are more than
two bidders, the size of segment is strictly decreasing. That is, x̂j− x̂j−1 > x̂j+1− x̂j
for j = 1, 2, . . . ,M − 1.
Figure 1.2 shows efficient partitions with ten messages when the number of
14
Figure 1.2: Efficient partition with 10 messages and uniform distribution
when the number of bidders is two to ten.
bidders is two to ten. The efficient partition becomes finer in a higher segment as
the number of bidders increases. Recall that the expected gain from trade is the sum
over all segment j of the products between the probability that the highest valuation
is in the segment j and the expected valuation of segment j. The probability that
the highest valuation is in the segment j can be thought as a weight. The weights
of the higher segments become larger as the number of bidders increases (similar to
the negatively-skewed PDF of the first-order statistic). The social planner therefore
squeezes the higher segments to the right to raise their expected valuations.
Corollary 1.2. If there are two bidders, the efficient partition vector x̂ satisfies
x̂j = E[x|x ∈ [x̂j−1, x̂j+1)] for j = 1, 2, . . . ,M − 1.
In an interval [x̂j−1, x̂j+1), if the mass of bidders leans more to the right, the
partition value x̂j shifts to the right as well. As a result, a segment located in a
denser portion of the type space is smaller. Figure 1.4 shows the case in which there
15
Figure 1.3: PDF of the first-order statistic (solid) and the efficient par-
tition (dashed) when there are ten messages and eight bidders whose
valuations are uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1].
are ten messages and two bidders whose valuations are distributed according to the
Beta distribution with α = β = 2. Since it is more likely that the highest valuation
lies in the middle of the type space, the efficient partition is finer in the middle and
becomes coarser further away.
1.4 Implementation
With the same number of messages, number of bidders and type space, the
efficient partition rule is applicable to implementation of any auction format. Each
auction format nonetheless requires a different set of bid levels to achieve the efficient
partition rule. Ultimately, any efficient discrete auction format in an identical setting
yields the same efficiency level.
In this section, we implement the efficient discrete auction mechanism with
16
Figure 1.4: PDF of the first-order statistic (solid) and the efficient par-
tition (dashed) when there are ten messages and two bidders whose val-
uation are distributed according to the Beta distribution with α = β = 2.
various auction formats. Once the efficient partition rule is derived as demonstrated
in the previous section, the probability of trade and expected payment are immedi-
ately identified. We can use them to determine the actual bid levels. To simplify
the analysis, assume that valuations are independently distributed on [0, 1]. We first
discuss about an implementation of sealed-bid auctions and then turn our attention
to clock auctions.
1.4.1 Sealed-bid Auctions
In a sealed-bid auction, each bidder simultaneously selects a bid amount from
available discrete bid levels. The item is awarded to the bidder who submits the
highest bid. If there is a tie, the item is randomly assigned to one of the high
bidders.
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Let p ≡ (p0, p1, . . . , pP−1) be a vector of bid levels such that p0 ≤ p1 ≤ · · · ≤
pP−1 where, for i = 0, 1, . . . , P − 1, pi is a bid amount and P is the number of
bid levels. Clearly, the number of available messages M is equal to the number
of bid levels P . Since higher bid amount implies higher priority, submitting a bid
pj corresponds to reporting a message mj in an ordered message space. In an
equilibrium, a bidder with valuation x ∈ [x̂j, x̂j+1) submits a sealed bid of pj. We
define the efficient bid levels in the first-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions
as follows.
Definition 1.6. The efficient bid levels of the first-price auction with P bid levels,




The efficient bid levels of the second-price auction with P bid levels, pII ≡
(pII0 , p
II
1 , . . . , p
II





























In both auctions, the individual rationality condition implies that pI0 = p
II
0 = 0.
In the first-price auction, the winner pays her bid. Therefore, the expected
payment is simply the product of probability of trade and bid amount. Since the
lowest valuation is zero but the probability of trade of the lowest-priority message
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m0 is strictly positive. The individual rationality condition implies that 0 · q(m0)−
t(m0) ≥ 0. So, t(m0) = 0 and thus pI0 = 0. Each bid level can be calculated by
solving the corresponding equation.
In the second-price auction, the payment when bidding pIIj can be any price
between pII0 and p
II
j depending on the second-highest bidder. The first term is
the expected payoff when one or more opponents submitted pIIj where k is the
number of opponents who submitted pIIj . A high bidder is awarded the item with a
probability 1/(k + 1). The second term is the expected payment when the second-
highest bid is less than pj. The second-highest bid and the number of second-highest
bidders are indexed by l and k, respectively. Individual rationality implies that
0 · q(m0) − t(m0) = −pII0 · F (x̂1)I−1/I ≥ 0. Therefore, pII0 = 0. The efficient bid
levels are characterized by M equations where the j-th equation has j unknowns,
pII1 to p
II
j . The efficient bid levels can be solved iteratively from zeroth to (M−1)-th
equation.
Corollary 1.3. The bid amounts in the efficient first-price auction are strictly in-
creasing whereas those in the efficient second-price auction may be non-unique.
Corollary suggested that bid amounts assigned to two different bid levels may
be the same in the second-price auction. However, their priorities are different, and
so are the probability of trade and expected payment. For instance, given a vector
of bid levels (0, 1/3, 1/3, 2/3, 2/3, 1), a bidder who submits the second 1/3 will win
over a bidder who submits the first 1/3. When this feature is to be implemented
in practice, two bid levels with the same bid amounts should be distinguishable.
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In addition to bid amounts, we can designate each bid level with lexicographic
indicators such as 1/3a and 1/3b where the bid level with higher lexicographic order
has a higher priority. Another way to distinguish identical bid amounts is to use a
time stamp to express priority. For example, if the auction is open for one hour, a
bid submitted during the first thirty minutes has a higher priority than the same
bid submitted during the last thirty minutes.
Intuitively, some bidders may bid above their valuations and some others
may shade. Consider an auction with two uniform bidders and bid levels are
(0, 1/3a, 1/3b, 2/3a, 2/3b, 1). A bidder with a valuation sufficiently close to 1/3 from
the left may find bidding 1/3 is more profitable in expectation than bidding zero
since her opponent may bid zero so that she will receive a positive profit without
having to face a tiebreaker. However, she risks winning the item at an unaffordable
price if her opponent also bids 1/3. The same bidder may find 1/3b less profitable
than 1/3a because the former’s probability of winning at an unaffordable price is too
high. Some other bidders with valuations close to 1/3 from the right may find that
shading bid to 1/3b is more profitable than 1/3a and 2/3a. We show an example in
Section 1.4.3.
1.4.2 Blind Ascending Clock Auctions
An ascending clock auction is one of the popular dynamic auction formats. In
a clock auction with a single item for sale, the auctioneer announces a current round
price and then asks bidders whether they want to bid or exit at the round price. If
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there is excess demand, the auctioneer increases the price by one increment. This
process continues until there is no excess demand. The item is awarded to the active
bidder. If there is excess supply, the item will be randomly awarded to the active
bidders in the previous round. The auction starts at round 1. If the auction reaches
the final round, the auction automatically ends and the item will be randomly
awarded to one of active bidders. We also impose the monotonic activity rule—once
a bidder exits, she cannot bid again in the subsequent rounds.
With discrete bid levels, there can be many market clearing prices. We con-
sider two popular pricing rules: highest-rejected bid (HRB) and lowest-accepted bid
(LAB). If there is only one active bidder in round t, HRB is the price in round t− 1
and the LAB is the price in round t. When there is excess supply in round t, both
HRB and LAB are equal to the price in round t− 1.
With a blind clock feature, no information is revealed after each round. A
blind clock auction is isomorphic to a sealed-bid auction. Specifically, exiting in
round t is equivalent to submitting a proxy bid equal to the price in round t − 1.
Hence, a bidder is to choose an exit round. Similar to a sealed-bid auction, the
numbers of messages and the number of bid levels are equal. HRB is equivalent to
the second-price and thus their efficient bid levels are identical. We will not repeat
the same analysis and characterize only a blind clock auction with LAB.
Definition 1.7. The efficient bid levels of the blind clock auction with highest-
rejected bid (HRB auction), pH ≡ (pH0 , pH1 , . . . , pHM−1), are the same as those of
the second-price auction. The efficient bid levels of the blind clock auction with
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lowest-accepted bid (LAB auction), pL ≡ (pL0 , pL1 , . . . , pLM−1), are defined by, for





























The individual rationality condition implies that the initial condition is pL0 = 0.
The conditions are similar to those of the second-price auction except that the
final price is the bid level above the second-highest bid instead of the one below.
Thus, pLl in the second term is replaced by p
L
l+1. Individual rationality implies that
0 · q(m0) − t(m0) = −pL0 · F (x̂1)I−1/I ≥ 0. Therefore, pL0 = 0. We can solve the
system of equations iteratively in a manner similar to the second-price auction.
1.4.3 Analytical solution: two uniform bidders
In this section, assume that there are two bidders whose valuations are inde-
pendently and uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. According to Corollary 1, the efficient




for j = 1, 2, . . . ,M − 2. It implies that segments are equally spaced. Therefore,
x̂j = j/M for j = 0, 1, . . . ,M − 1. Substituting the efficient partition into the
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probability of trade and expected payment yields, for j = 0, 1, . . . ,M − 1,































Since ∆j = p
I
j+1 − pIj =
2(1+j)2
(4j2+8j+3)M
> 0 and ∆j+1 −∆j = − 2(8j3+36j2+46j+15)M < 0,
the efficient bid increment is strictly decreasing in size.
In the second-price auction, the efficient bid levels are defined by, for j =

















pIIj − pIIj−1 =
j(j + 1)
M




Solving the difference equation with the initial condition pII1 = 0 yields
pIIj =
2j + 1− (−1)j
2M
Bid amounts of the (2k)-th and (2k + 1)-th bid levels are the same where k =
1, 2, . . . , bM−1
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k = 0, 1, . . . , bM−1
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, for k = 1, 2, . . . , bM−1
2
c overbids.
In an LAB auction, similar to the method used in the analysis of second-price









pLj − pLj−1 =
j(j + 1)
M
− j(j − 1)
M
− 2pLj
Solving the difference equation with the initial condition pL1 = 0 yields
pLj =
2j · 3j − 3j + 1
2M · 3j
Figure 1.5 shows bid functions in the first-price, second-price and LAB auctions
with two bidders and 10 bid levels. The dashed line is a 45 degree line. The efficient
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Figure 1.5: Bid functions in the first-price, second-price and clock LAB
auctions with two bidders and 10 bid levels . Dashed line is a 45 degree
line.
partition is (0, 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 1). The bid function in the first-price auction closely
follows the bid function in a continuous case, x/2, and is slightly decreasing. The bid
functions of the second-price and LAB auctions trace the truthful bidding function
but the bid increments of the latter are slightly increasing. As discussed in Section
1.4.1, the bidding strategy in the second-price auction involves both overbidding and
shading. Bidders with valuations lying on the left segment of the same bid amount










The expected revenue in the continuous case, 1/3, is subtracted by the second
term involving an inverse of the number of messages. Hence, the expected revenue
is increasing in the number of messages. As the number of messages increases,
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Figure 1.6: Gains from trade of the first-price, second-price and LAB
auctions with three to ten equally spaced bid levels.
the second term gets smaller and the expected revenue converges to that of the
continuous case.
It is interesting to see efficiency when bid levels are chosen naively. Without
optimizing, it is natural to set the bid levels to be equally spaced and trace the
equilibrium bid functions in the standard setting. Hence, the bid levels of the
first-price, second-price and LAB auctions with M bid levels are defined as follows:
pIj = j/2(M − 1), pIIj = j/(M − 1) and pLj = j/M . The symmetric equilibria of
these auctions can be solved numerically.
Figure 1.6 shows the comparison of the expected gains from trade of auctions
with bid levels chosen naively and the optimal level. The efficiencies of all auction
formats asymptotically go to the fully efficient level. Efficiency of the second-price
auction lies closely to the efficient level while efficiencies of the first-price and LAB
are below and converge to the efficient level later on. Naively-chosen bid levels can
perform well with the large number of bid levels. With many bidders, an auction
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Figure 1.7: Gain from trade of the first-price, second-price and LAB
auctions with five bid levels and two to ten bidders.
with naively chosen bid levels may yield considerably lower revenue than the efficient
auction. Figure 1.7 shows gain from trade of various auctions with five bid levels
and two to ten bidders. As the number of bidders increases, all gains from trade
diverge from the efficient level. Remarkably, the gain from trade of the first-price
auction departs from the efficient level at the highest rate.
1.5 Clock Auction with Demand Disclosure
In dynamic auctions, it is more common to reveal an aggregate demand after
the end of each round. Bidders will bid more aggressively if they are aware of
more competition. Moreover, they will make use of disclosed demand to make an
inference about opponent’s valuation. For instance, if an opponent bids when the
demand is low, one can infer that the opponent’s valuation is relatively high. On the
contrary, if the opponent bids when the demand is high, the opponent’s valuation
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might not be as high as in previous scenario as the competition could be another
factor inducing her opponent to bid more aggressively. Thus, a bidder may bid in
a round with a particular demand history but may drop out in the same round
with different demand history. The history dependence complicates the use of the
mechanism design approach. Given a probability of trade and expected transfer, the
derivation of efficient bid levels requires a system of equations involving bid levels
and probability of winning for all possible demand histories. We therefore approach
the problem with indirect mechanism.
Suppose the number of rounds P is exogenously given. If the auction reaches
round P − 1, the auction automatically ends and the item is randomly awarded to
one of the active bidders. Let ht ≡ (h1, h2, . . . , ht) be a demand history in round
t where hs ∈ I is the number of active bidders at the beginning of round s, for
s = 1, 2, . . . , t. The monotonic activity rule implies that I = h1 ≥ h2 ≥ · · · ≥ ht ≥ 2.
Let Ht ≡ {ht|hs ∈ I for s = 1, 2, . . . , t and I = h1 ≥ h2 ≥ · · · ≥ ht ≥ 2} be a set of
all possible demand histories in round t.
Let x∗t be a critical valuation in round t. We consider a monotonic bidding
strategy: in round t, a bidder with valuation x bids if x ≥ x∗t and drops out if
x < x∗t . A bidder with valuation x
∗
t is indifferent between bidding and dropping out.
We assume that she always chooses to bid. Given this bidding strategy, the inferred
lower bound of active opponent’s valuation in round t is x∗t−1 because opponents
with valuations less than x∗t−1 would have already dropped out in round t− 1. The
critical valuation x∗t depends on the number of active bidders ht and the inferred
lower bound x∗t−1. The recursive relationship of the critical valuation implies that
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the critical valuation x∗t is a function of the entire demand history ht. A symmetric
equilibrium can be defined as follows.
Proposition 1.9. Define a critical valuation function as x∗t : Ht → [0, 1]. A sym-
metric Bayesian equilibrium of a clock auction with demand disclosure is fully char-
acterized by a set of critical valuation x∗ ≡ {x∗t (ht)}t=1,2,...,P−1,ht∈Ht.
Similar to bidders, in round t with demand history ht, the social planner
learns about demand and the lower bound of bidders’ valuations. Given that there
are ht bidders with valuations in the sub-type space [x
∗
t−1(ht−1), 1], the social plan-
ner chooses where to split the sub-type space to maximize the expected gain from
trade. Thus, the partition rule is contingent on demand history as well. The critical
valuation is equivalent to the partition rule by construction.
Define Φt : Ht → R as expected gain from trade in round t. The expected
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. The first two terms are the expected gain
from trade if the auction ends in round t. The last term is a sum of expected gain
from trade for all possible demand histories in round t+ 1. Note that ΦP (hP ,x
∗) is
virtually a gain from trade if two or more bidders bid in round P − 1. There is no
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actual bidding round P .
The social-choice function can be written as Φ(x∗) ≡ Φ1(I,x∗). The so-
cial planner’s problem is to maximize the expected gain from trade in round 1
by choosing the critical valuations for all possible demand histories. The efficient
partition rule in a clock auction with demand disclosure is characterized by x∗ =
arg maxx∗ Φ(x
∗) subject to (1) x∗t (ht−1 ∪ (s)) ≥ x∗t−1(ht−1) for all s = 2, 3, . . . , ht−1
and ht−1 ∈ Ht−1 and (2) x ∈ [0, 1] for x ∈ x∗. The first-order conditions are∇Φ = 0.
We can solve for x∗ as the number of equations and the number of unknowns are
both equal to the number of possible demand histories
∑P−1
s=1 |Hs| . The social
planner can commit to the partition rule since it is contingent on demand history.
Proposition 1.10. A clock auction with demand disclosure is more efficient than
the blind version with the same number of rounds, number of bidders and type space.
It is known that revealing demand is efficiency enhancing in the affiliated
valuation setting. Proposition 1.10 suggests that the demand disclosure can improve
efficiency even in the independent private valuation setting where a price discovery
is irrelevant. An implicit assumption however is that bid levels are chosen optimally.
One can implement an efficient partition rule in a blind clock auction with
a clock auction with demand disclosure. The expected gain from trade in static
auction ϕ(x̂) is equivalent to the one in dynamic auction Φ(x∗) with constraints
x∗t (ht) = x̂t for all ht ∈ Ht and t = 1, 2, . . . , P − 1. Note that a different set of bid
levels is needed since bidders still respond to demand history. The social planner’s
problem in a blind clock auction is equivalently an optimization of a clock auction
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with demand disclosure with additional constraints. Since the optimization with
fewer constraints yields higher value of objective function, a auction clock auction
with demand disclosure is more efficient than the blind clock auction. When there
are two bidders, demand history is irrelevant since a bidder can imply that her
opponent is still active if the auction continues. In such case, both auctions are
equally efficient.
Once we derive the efficient partition rule, we can implement them with bid
levels. In each round with a particular demand history, we can choose a bid level
such that the critical valuation coincides with the efficient partition rule. Hence, bid
levels must be contingent on demand history as well. Bid levels in a clock auction
with demand disclosure are given by {pt(ht)}t=1,2,...,P−1,ht∈Ht . With HRB and LAB
pricing rules, the efficient bid levels of a clock auction with demand disclosure are
characterized in Definition 1.8.
Definition 1.8. The efficient bid levels of the clock auction with highest-rejected bid
and demand disclosure (HRBD), pHD ≡ {pHDt (ht)}t=1,2,...,P−1,ht∈Ht, are defined by,



























x∗t+1(ht ∪ (j))− x∗t (ht)
1− x∗t−1(ht−1)
)j (x∗t (ht)− x∗t−1(ht−1)
1− x∗t−1(ht−1)
)ht−j−1
The efficient bid levels of the clock auction with lowest-accepted bid and de-
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mand disclosure (LABD), pLD ≡ {pLDt (ht)}t=1,2,...,P−1,ht∈Ht, are defined by, for
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In both auctions, the individual rationality condition implies that pHD0 (∅) = pLD0 (∅) =
0.
The conditions in HRBD and LABD auctions are similar except that the
final prices when all bidders drop out (the first term on the right-handed side)
are pHDt−1 (ht) and p
LD
t (ht), respectively. By construction, a bidder with a valuation
x∗t (ht) is indifferent between bidding and dropping out in round t with a demand
history ht. The expected payoff of dropping out is on the left-hand side. That is,
the bidder wins only when all opponents also drop out and she wins the tiebreaker.
The expected payoff of bidding is given on the right-hand side. The first term on
the right-hand side is a scenario in which all opponents drop out. The second term
on the right-hand side is the probability that the bidder wins the tiebreaker when
one or more opponents bid. In this scenario, one or more opponents bid in round
t and drop out in the next round and the bidder wins the tiebreaker. The number
of opponents who bid ranges from one to ht − 1 as indicated in the summation. A
bidder with valuation of zero will drop out in the first round. Her expected payoff
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in HRBD or LABD auction is x∗1(I)
I · (0 − pHD0 (∅))/I or x∗1(I)I · (0 − pLD0 (∅))/I,
respectively. Thus, individual rationality implies that pHD0 (∅) = pLD0 (∅) = 0.
1.5.1 Example: three bid levels and three bidders
Assume that bidders’ valuations are independently and uniformly distributed
on the interval [0, 1]. With three bid levels, there are two rounds and three possible
active bidder histories: (3), (3, 3) and (3, 2). We can derive x∗1(3) = 0.42, x
∗
2(3, 2) =
0.71 and x∗2(3, 3) = 0.76. As expected, the critical valuation is higher when there
are more active bidders. In the first round, the social planner splits the type space
at 0.42. If there are two active bidders in round 2, the efficient partition is equally
spaced because of the uniform type space. The critical valuation in this case is
x∗2(3, 2) = (1 + 0.42)/2 = 0.71. Since the PDF of the first-order statistic is skewed
more negatively when there are three active bidders, x∗2(3, 3) > x
∗
2(3, 2).
The efficient bid levels in HRBD and LABD auctions can be derived by solving
systems of equations defined in Definition 1.8. The efficient bid levels are shown in
Table 1.1. In LABD auction, each critical valuation is higher than its associated bid
level. All bidders shade due to the first-price incentive—an incentive to keep the
final price low. In HRBD auction, some bidders may overbid when demand history
is (3) or (3, 3) as pHD1 (3) and p
HD
2 (3, 3) exceed their associated critical valuations.
Overbidding in HRB pricing rule is profitable if all opponents drop out so that the
final price is equal to the previous round price. Surprisingly, the bid level in round
1 is greater than that in round 2 when demand history is (3, 2). The bid levels
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Table 1.1: Efficient bid levels in HRBD and LABD auctions with three
bid levels and three bidders
Demand history Critical valuation Bid level
HRBD LABD
(∅) - 0 0
(3) 0.42 0.73 0.35
(3, 2) 0.71 0.69 0.59
(3, 3) 0.76 0.77 0.68
when the demand history is (3, 2) needs to be equal to 0.69 to make a bidder with
valuation 0.71 indifferent between bidding and dropping out.
The peculiar characteristics of efficient bid levels HRBD auction may make it
less appealing. A bidder who wins in round 1 may end up paying more than the
one who wins in round 2. In practice, one would find the equally-efficient LABD
auction more desirable as their bid levels are more intuitive.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper offers an insight into an important design aspect of the discrete
auction: the choice of bid levels. The social planner’s problem is to choose a partition
rule to maximize efficiency. The efficient partition rule can be implemented with bid
levels in various auction formats. Our approach has an advantage over the previous
literature because it is not specific to a particular auction format. The efficient
partition rule is applicable to many auction formats given that the type space,
number of bidders and number of messages are the same. Any auction consistent
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with the efficient partition rule yields the maximum attainable efficiency. Intuitively,
efficiency cannot be improved by altering the auction format as long as bid levels
are chosen optimally.
One way to increase efficiency is to permit additional messages. In a sealed-
bid auction, allowing bid levels to be as fine as the smallest currency unit is feasible
and the cost is marginal, if not more. In addition, with such a large number of
messages, the efficiency loss when bid levels are chosen naively is likely to be small.
On the contrary, motivations for coarser bid levels in a dynamic auction are much
stronger. Auction duration becomes a concern since the cost of conducting auction
and bidders’ participation costs are increasing as the auction goes on. While smaller
bid increments promote efficiency, it may take longer to conclude and thus incurs
more cost. The social planner therefore faces a tradeoff between efficiency loss
and auction duration. We show that efficiency in a clock auction can be improved
without prolonging the auction by revealing demand. To determine the optimal
number of messages, we can setup the optimization problem where the objective
function is the social gain-efficiency minus social cost.
Ausubel and Cramton (2004) suggested that the discreteness of bid levels can
be overcome by the use of intra-round bidding. That is, a bidder can specify a price
at which she wants to reduce demand. While it has been used in some auctions, it is
not common. With this feature, the auction is fully efficient regardless of the choice
of bid levels in the independent private value setting. However, in the affiliated
value setting the choice of bid levels still affects efficiency through within-round
price discovery because bidders as well as the social planner learn about demand
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only at the previous bid levels and prices below. The motivation for choosing efficient
bid levels is even stronger when values are more correlated.
One natural extension is to design a revenue-maximizing discrete auction. The
objective function takes the form of expected revenue instead of the expected gain
from trade. It is also interesting to compare reserve prices between continuous and
discrete auctions. Regardless, the concept remains the same: to choose the optimal




Pricing Rule in a Clock Auction
2.1 Introduction
In 2008, the government of India announced that radio spectrum for 3G mobile
services would be auctioned in 2009. The 2.1 GHz spectrum is to be sold as paired
spectrum (2x5 MHz blocks) in each of 22 regions covering India. There are one
to four lots available in each region and each bidder can obtain at most one lot
per region. The government’s stated objective for the auction emphasizes revenue
maximization rather than efficiency. In December 2008, the government announced
the chosen auction design: a discrete clock auction with lowest-accepted bid (LAB)
pricing and provisional winners (Telecommunications & Information Technology,
2008). Here we examine the equilibrium properties of such an auction in a simplified
setting. As a comparison, we analyze a discrete clock auction with highest-rejected
bid (HRB) pricing and exit bids. This format is often used in high-stake auctions
in practice (Ausubel & Cramton, 2004).
Interestingly, with profit maximizing bidders, we find the HRB auction dom-
inates the LAB auction in both efficiency and revenues. The HRB with exit bids
is fully efficient, since it is a dominant strategy to bid up to one’s valuation. In
contrast, LAB with provisional winners has differential shading, since a provisional
winner shades her bid, whereas a provisional loser does not. This differential shading
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creates an inefficiency and reduces revenues. Given this strong theoretical result, it
may seem odd that India chose the LAB format.
One potential explanation comes from behavioral economics. If bidders antic-
ipate the regret of losing at a profitable price, they may be reluctant to shade bids
as a provisional winner. This fear of losing has been shown to explain overbidding
in first-price sealed-bid auctions (Filiz-Ozbay & Ozbay, 2007; Engelbrecht-Wiggans
& Katok, 2007, 2008). Risk aversion is an alternative explanation for overbidding,
but has little empirical support (Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Katok, 2009). Delgado et
al. (2008) provide a neurological foundation that fear of losing, not joy of winning, is
the source of overbidding in first-price auctions. Loss aversion with a reference point
of winning (Kőszegi & Rabin, 2006; Lange & Ratan, 2010) provides an analogous
theory for fear of losing. When we extend the standard theory to include a fear
of losing, we find that if bidders’ fear of losing is sufficiently strong, then the LAB
auction revenue dominates the HRB auction. This result provides an explanation
for India’s selection of a seemingly inferior auction format.
Most theoretical papers on clock auctions assume a continuous clock for conve-
nience. In practice, clock auctions use a discrete price clock, since these auctions typ-
ically are conducted on the internet, and communication is not sufficiently reliable to
bind bidders to higher prices with the continuous passage of time. With discrete bid
levels, the two predominant pricing rules, lowest-accepted bid and highest-rejected
bid, are distinct, and the auction designer must select a pricing rule as well as other
elements of the design. Currently, there is little literature for the auction designer
to turn to for help with this issue.
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There are a limited number of papers investigating auctions with discrete bid
levels. These papers focus on explaining bidding behavior. Chwe (1989) studied
the first-price auction with discrete bid levels and showed that the expected revenue
is less than its continuous counterpart. (Mathews & Sengupta, 2008) analyzed a
sealed-bid second-price auction with discrete bids.
More closely related is the work that considers choices of bid levels in ascending
auctions. Rothkopf and Harstad (1994) is an important early contribution, deter-
mining optimal bid levels that maximize expected revenue in an oral auction. The
paper also introduces the trade-off between auction duration and bid increments.
David et al. (2007) extend the model of Rothkopf and Harstad and find that de-
creasing bid increments are optimal. Although the pricing rule in our paper is the
same as in Rothkopf and Harstad, the auction formats have important differences,
which result in significantly different bidding behavior.
We consider a discrete clock auction with two pricing rules: highest-rejected
bid and lowest-accepted bid. Bidders have independent private values and unit
demands. We first analyze bidding behavior in an HRB auction. This is our bench-
mark for comparing performance with the LAB auction. The HRB auction is a
useful benchmark because of its simplicity, its desirable properties (efficiency and
truth dominance), and its use in practice. In contrast, the LAB auction forces
bidders to engage in difficult tradeoffs. We are only able to solve for equilibrium
bidding behavior in a simplified setting. Nonetheless, we show that an LAB auction
is generally inefficient. Despite this inefficiency, the LAB auction can yield higher
revenues if bidders anticipate the regret of losing at profitable prices, and therefore
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engage in less bid shading than a bidder focused solely on profit maximization.
2.2 Discrete clock auction with unit demand
There are K identical items for sale to N risk-neutral bidders indexed by
i = 1, . . . , N where N > K. The seller values the items at zero. Bidder i demands
at most one item. Her private valuation for the item is xi which is independently
drawn from the distribution F with associated density function f on the interval
[0, 1]. (We use the independent private values model for simplicity. Our main results
extend to a model with affiliated values.) Bidder i’s payoff if she wins the item is
xi −mi where mi is bidder i’s payment and zero otherwise.
Before the auction starts, the seller announces a vector of bid levels, P =
(P0, P1, . . . , PT−1) where Pt is the clock price at round t for t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1
and T is the number of bid levels. The clock price increases every round so that
P0 < P1 < · · · < PT−1. Define the bid increment in round t as ∆t = Pt − Pt−1
for t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1. Assume that P0 = 0 and PT−1 = 1. The auction begins
in round 1 at a price P1. In round t, bidder i chooses either to bid at the current
clock price, qit = 1, or to exit, qit = 0. Once a bidder exits she cannot bid again.
Let Qt =
∑N
i=1 qit be total demand in round t. If there is excess demand, Qt > K,
the auction proceeds to the next round. The auction ends in the round t such that
Qt ≤ K.
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2.2.1 Highest-rejected bid with exit bids
In the HRB format (highest-rejected bid with exit bids), if bidder i exits in
round t, the bidder can submit an exit bid-a price between Pt−1 and Pt at which she
wants to exit. In round t such that Qt = K, the items are awarded to the K active
bidders and the final price is the highest exit bid among the inactive bidders . If
Qt < K, the items are awarded to the Qt active bidders and to those bidders who
submitted the K − Qt highest exit bids. The final price is the K − Qt + 1-highest
exit bid.
Proposition 2.1. In the HRB auction, truthful bidding (bidding up to one’s valua-
tion) is a weakly-dominant strategy. Therefore, the HRB auction yields an efficient
allocation. Each of the K-highest valuation bidders wins and pays the K+ 1-highest
valuation.
This result follows immediately from the unit demand setting and the ability
to submit exit bids at actual valuations. Unit demand guarantees that each winner
pays the Vickrey price, thereby inducing truthful bidding. Since all bidders bid
truthfully, the items are awarded to the bidders who value them the most.
2.2.2 Lowest-accepted bid with provisional winners
In the LAB format (lowest-accepted bid with provisional winners), if there is
excess demand in any round, the seller randomly selects K provisional winners for
the next round from active bidders and ranks them from K to one (highest rank is
given priority). Other remaining active bidders are designated as provisional losers
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(rank of 0) for the next round. Each bidder is automatically assigned a rank in
round 1.
The auction ends if there is no excess demand. The items are awarded to
the active bidders and the remaining items are awarded to the inactive provisional
winner in the current round with the highest rank and so on until all items are
sold. Since bidders are not allowed to submit exit bids, the final price and bids are
restricted to clock prices. The final price is uniform and determined by theK-highest
winner’s bid. If Qt = K, the final price is Pt and if Qt < K, the final price is Pt−1.
Notice that the ranking is relevant in determining the allocation only when Qt < K
since then there is excess supply at the final price Pt−1. Let θ ≡ {0, 1, . . . , K} be
the set of all possible ranks and Θ ≡ {Xt|Xt ∈ θt} be the set of all possible bidder’s
ranking histories up from round 1 to round t. Let Rit ∈ θ denote bidder i’s rank in
round t and Hit ≡ (Ri1, Ri2, . . . , Rit) ∈ Θt be a vector of bidder i’s ranking history
from round 1 to round t. Bidder i’s ranking history Hit is known only to bidder i.
One important difference between the LAB auction described here and an
ascending bid auction with the same pricing rule is that in the LAB auction, a
provisional winner must keep topping her own bid in order to be eligible to bid in
subsequent rounds. In contrast, in an ascending bid auction with LAB, being a
provisional winner is counted as being active. Therefore, a provisional winner does
not need to bid in order to be eligible to bid in the subsequent rounds.
To better illustrate the LAB pricing rule with ranking, consider an auction
with three bidders and two items for sale. Suppose all bidders bid in round t−1 and
bidder 2 and 3 are selected as provisional winners with ranks of 1 and 2 respectively
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Table 2.1: LAB auction with three bidders and two items in round t
Case Bidder 1 Bidder 2 Bidder 3 Outcome
(R1t = 0) (R2t = 1) (R3t = 2)
1 Bid Bid Bid Proceed to round t + 1
2 Bid Bid Exit Bidder 1 and 2 win and the final price is Pt
3 Bid Exit Bid Bidder 1 and 3 win and the final price is Pt
4 Exit Bid Bid Bidder 2 and 3 win and the final price is Pt
5 Bid Exit Exit Bidder 1 and 3 win and the final price is Pt−1
6 Exit Bid Exit Bidder 2 and 3 win and the final price is Pt−1
7 Exit Exit Bid Bidder 2 and 3 win and the final price is Pt−1
8 Exit Exit Exit Bidder 2 and 3 win and the final price is Pt−1
while Bidder 1 is a provisional loser. In round t, eight possible combinations of bids
and corresponding allocations and final prices are shown in Table 2.1. If all bidders
bid (case 1), the auction proceeds to round t+ 1 with a price of Pt+1 and all bidders
are assigned new ranks. Regardless of ranking, if there are exactly two active bidders
(case 2 to 4), they win the items at the current clock price Pt. If there is only one
active bidder which creates an excess supply at the current clock price (case 5 to
7), the item is awarded to the active bidder and an inactive provisional winner with
highest rank at the previous clock price Pt−1. Finally, if there is no active bidder
(case 8), bidders 2 and 3 who hold the highest ranks win at the previous clock price
Pt−1.
Lemma 2.1. For any K, in any round t > s+1 with any ranking history Hit ∈ Θt,
bidder i with valuation xi < Ps+1 exits.
This lemma simply states that a bidder with a valuation less than Ps+1 never
bids at a price Ps+2 or above. In some situations a bidder may take a risk by bidding
in round s + 1 at a price Ps+1 which is higher than her valuation in the hope that
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there will be excess supply and she will consequently win the item at the previous
clock price Ps. When she find out that the auction actually continues to round s+2
it is a dominant strategy to exit immediately regardless of her ranking since the
lowest possible final price is Ps+1, which is still higher than her valuation.
Lemma 2.2. For any K, in any round t with any ranking history Hit ∈ Θt, a
provisional loser with valuation xi bids if xi ≥ Pt. For any K > 1, in any round t
with some ranking history Hit ∈ Θt, a provisional loser with valuation xi < Pt bids
in round t if xi is sufficiently close to Pt.
For a provisional loser, exiting yields a payoff of zero while bidding yields a
positive expected payoff as long as her valuation is above the current clock price.
Thus, a provisional loser never exits if her valuation exceeds the current clock price.
For some ranking history, a provisional loser may bid at a price level above her
valuation since there is a positive probability that less than K−1 bids are submitted
and that by bidding, she can win the item at the previous clock price which is below
her valuation. However, such a strategy entails a risk of winning the item at a
price higher than her valuation. As a provisional loser’s valuation is closer to Pt,
the negative payoff she may receive if the auction continues is smaller while the
positive payoff in case that she wins is larger. Therefore, a provisional loser who has
a valuation closer to Pt may find that bidding is more attractive. If she does not
win, she will exit in round t+ 1 according to Lemma 2.1.
Consider the example in Table 2.1. Suppose bidder 1 has a valuation between
Pt−1 and Pt. If she bids and bidder 2 and 3 exit as in Case 5 which has a positive
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probability of occurring, bidder 1 wins the item at Pt−1 gaining a positive payoff.
If bidder 1 bids and either bidder 2 or bidder 3 bid, as in Case 2 or 3, bidder 1
wins the item at Pt, receiving a negative payoff. If all bidders bid, bidder 1 will exit
according to Lemma 2.1.
Lemma 2.3. For any K ≥ 1, there exists a round t ≤ s with some ranking history
Hit ∈ Θt such that a provisional winner with a valuation xi ≥ Ps exits if xi is
sufficiently close to Ps.
Intuitively, a provisional winner faces the first-price incentive, an incentive
to keep the price low, which results in exiting before her valuation is reached. A
provisional winner can win the item at a lower price if she exits, but she risks losing
at a profitable price as exiting is irrevocable. In contrast, if she stays in the auction,
her probability of winning the item increases and so does the expected final price
she pays. Hence, a provisional winner may find that exiting yields higher expected
payoff than bidding.
In addition, a provisional winner with higher rank faces less risk of losing when
exiting since a greater number of new bids are required to displace her provisional
winning bid. Consequently, there is some ranking history such that a provisional
winner with a particular valuation bids if her rank is less than r but one with the
same valuation exits if her rank is equal to or greater than r.
In the scenario in Table 2.1, bidder 2 who is a provisional winner faces a
tradeoff between bidding and exiting. Suppose bidder 1 will bid with certainty. By
exiting, bidder 2 may win at the price Pt−1 if bidder 3 exits (case 5) but she will
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lose if bidder 3 stays in. In contrast, by bidding, bidder 2 may win at the higher
price Pt if bidder 3 exits (case 2).
Proposition 2.2. The LAB auction is inefficient.
There are two sources of inefficiency: discrete bid levels and asymmetric bid-
ding behavior. First, discrete bid levels may prevent bidders from expressing a
difference in their valuations. Any auction with discrete bid levels is generally ineffi-
cient. As the size of bid increments becomes small, so does the difference between the
HRB and LAB pricing rules. The difference in efficiency is smaller as well. Second,
although bidders and their bidding strategies are symmetric, asymmetric bidding
behavior is introduced by naming and ranking provisional winners as discussed in
Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3. In some situations, a bidder with a particular valuation bids
if she is a provisional loser but in the same circumstances, she exits if she is a provi-
sional winner. Differential bid shading is exhibited among provisional winners and
bidding above valuation is found among provisional losers. These differences are a
separate source of inefficiency.
Exit bids in the HRB auction overcome both sources of inefficiency of the LAB
auction. In the HRB auction, there is no bid shading and all value differences are
expressed.
2.3 Equilibrium characterization with one item and two bidders
In order to further characterize equilibrium behavior in the LAB auction, it
is necessary to simplify the setting to one item and two bidders, 1 and 2. These
46
assumptions are maintained through Section 2.8. Although this setting is limiting,
it will provide intuition for cases with more items and more bidders.
With two bidders and a single item, there are two possible ranks: a provisional
winner or a provisional loser. Once a bidder knows her rank, she can infer that her
opponent’s rank is the other. Specifically, for all t, H1t is the complement of H2t
and vice versa. The auction ends when at least one bidder exits. If in round t only
one bidder exits, the active bidder receives the item and pays Pt. If both bidders
exit in round t, the provisional winner in round t gets the item at a price of Pt−1.
Definition 2.1. Bidder i follows a straightforward bidding strategy in round t when
qit(xi) =

1 ; if xi ≥ Pt
0 ; if xi < Pt
.
Lemma 2.4. For a bidder with any rank, bidding above her valuation is a weakly
dominated strategy. For a provisional loser, bidding straightforwardly is a weakly
dominant strategy.
As discussed in Lemma 2.2, a provisional loser bids if her valuation is higher
than the current clock price. In the one-item case, the final price is at least the
current clock price if one or more bids are submitted. In contrast to the case with
two or more items, it is not profitable for a bidder with any rank to bid when the
current clock price is above her valuation.
The fact that a provisional loser bids straightforwardly greatly simplifies the
analysis. To construct an equilibrium, we need to solve for the bidding behavior of a
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provisional winner. A provisional winner’s bidding strategy depends not only on her
valuation, but also on the history of the opponent’s ranks. For instance, a provisional
winner may exit when a ranking history implies that a provisional loser’s valuation
has a lower bound less than the next clock price. In contrast, a provisional winner
will continue to compete when an inferred provisional loser’s valuation is higher
than the current clock price. This dependence on the history of rankings implies
that even with the same realized valuation different ranking histories may produce
different allocations and final prices.
Lemma 2.5. In any round t, a provisional winner’s expected gain from exiting—
expected payoff from exiting less expected payoff from bidding—is decreasing in her
valuation.
Simply put, a provisional winner’s bidding strategy is monotonic in valuation.
Intuitively, if an optimal strategy of a provisional winner with valuation x in any
round t is bidding (exiting), it is an optimal strategy of a provisional winner with
valuation x′ > x (x′ < x) to bid (exit) in round t as well.
Let x̂t : Θt → [0, 1] be a critical valuation for a bidding strategy in round t.
This function x̂t(Hit) indicates that in round t, a bidder with a valuation at least
x̂t(Hit) will bid while one with valuation less than x̂t(Hit) will exit. Moreover, if
Pt−1 < x̂t(Hit) < Pt, x̂t(Hit) is a valuation of a bidder who is indifferent between
bidding and exiting in round t for a ranking history Hit.
According to Lemma 2.4, the provisional loser bid straightforwardly regardless
of the ranking history. Therefore, for any ranking history Hit ∈ Θt such thatRit = 0,
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x̂t(Hit) = Pt.
In each round, a bidder applies Bayesian updating to the lower bound of her
opponent’s valuation and uses this lower bound to determine an optimal strategy.
For example, suppose in round t with bidder 1’s ranking history of H1t, bidder 1 was
a provisional loser and bidder 2 was a provisional winner. Suppose both of them
have a valuation above Pt+1 and bid at Pt. In round t + 1, bidder 1 is selected as
a provisional winner and she makes an inference that bidder 2’s valuation must be
in [x̂t(H2t), 1]. If for instance, Pt+1 < x̂t(H2t) < Pt+2, bidder 1, aware that bidder
2 has a valuation higher than the current clock price and follows a straightforward
bidding strategy, will bid in round t+ 1.
The lower bound is at least the previous clock price since no bidder bids above
her valuation according to Lemma 2.4. It can be higher than the previous clock price
when an equilibrium strategy suggests that the critical valuation of the provisional
winner is higher than the previous clock price and she in turn bid. Importantly,
being a provisional winner reveals more information on valuation to the opponent
than being a provisional loser.
Let lt(Hjt) ≡ max{Pt−1, x̂t−1(Hj,t−1)} be an inferred lower bound of bidder
j’s valuation in round t as a function of a ranking history Hjt. Consider a provi-
sional winner i in round t with valuation is xi > Pt. Let πit(qit, xi,Hit) be bidder
i’s expected payoffs in round t when submitting a decision qit ∈ {0, 1} given a rank-
ing history Hit where 0 and 1 correspond to exiting and bidding respectively. If
lt(Hjt) ≥ Pt, a provisional winner’s dominant strategy is bidding if xi ≥ Pt and
exiting otherwise. Next, consider the case where lt(Hjt) ∈ [Pt−1, Pt). Let Πi,t+1 be
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bidder i’s expected payoff in round t + 1 if the auction proceeds to round t + 1.
Bidder i’s payoffs of bidding and exiting in round t are, respectively,
πit(qit = 1, xi,Hit) ≡ (xi − Pt)
F (Pt)− F (lt(Hjt))
1− F (lt(Hjt))
+ Πi,t+1
πit(qit = 0, xi,Hit) ≡ (xi − Pt−1)
F (Pt)− F (lt(Hjt))
1− F (lt(Hjt))
.
It is an optimal strategy to bid if πit(qit = 1, xi,Hit) ≥ πit(qit = 0, xi,Hit)
and exit if πit(qit = 1, xi,Hit) < πit(qit = 0, xi,Hit). x̂t(Hit) can be either equal
to a clock price or between two consecutive clock prices. It is equal to a clock
price, say Pt for t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 2, if πit(qit = 1, Pt,Hit) ≥ πit(qit = 0, Pt,Hit)
and πit(qit = 1, Pt − ε,Hit) < πit(qit = 0, Pt − ε,Hit) where ε is a small positive
number. x̂t(Hit) will be between Ps and Ps+1 if πit(qit = 1, x̂t(Hit),Hit) = πit(qit =
0, x̂t(Hit),Hit) and x̂t(Hit) ∈ (Ps, Ps+1). We assign x̂t(Hit) =∞ if it is optimal for
a provisional winner with any valuation to exit regardless of the ranking history.
Obviously, x̂T−1(Hi,t−1) =∞ for any Hi,t−1 ∈ Θt−1.
Proposition 2.3. An equilibrium of a discrete clock auction with LAB is charac-
terized by x̂t(Hit) for all Hit ∈ Θt and for all t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1. In any round t
with a ranking history Hit ∈ Θt, a bidder i bids if her valuation is in [x̂t(Hit), 1]
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Figure 2.1: Strategy of a provisional winner with valuation x ∈ [Pt, Pt+1)
2.4 Equilibrium characterization with a fixed bid increment and uni-
form valuations
To further characterize equilibrium behavior, it is helpful to assume a fixed
bid increment and assume that valuations are uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Thus,
∆t = ∆ =
1
T−1 for all t and F (x) = x. We maintain these assumptions through
Section 1.8.
Lemma 2.6. In any round t ≤ s− 2 with a ranking history Hit ∈ Θt, a provisional
winner in round t with a valuation x ∈ [Ps, Ps+1) always bids.
Assuming fixed bid increments and uniform valuations greatly simplifies the
equilibrium derivation, since we only need to solve for the provisional winner’s bid-
ding behaviors in the two rounds below her valuation. Figure 2.1 summarizes the
strategy of a bidder with valuation x ∈ [Pt, Pt+1) when she is a provisional winner.
According to Lemma 2.6, if she is a provisional winner in any round 1 to t − 2,
she will bid. She may bid or exit, if she is a provisional winner in round t − 1 or
t depending on her valuation and ranking history. By Lemma 2.4, she will exit in
round t+ 1 regardless.
Proposition 2.4. Inefficiency in the LAB auction can be reduced by smaller bid
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Table 2.2: Valuations of a provisional winner whose optimal strategy is
bidding in each round and ranking history
Round Price Ranking History Value
1 1/3 (1) [4/5, 1]
2 2/3 (1,1) None
(0,1) [2/3, 1]
3 1 Any None
increments.
In this setting, efficiency suffers from discrete bid levels and differential bid
shading. However, according to Lemma 2.6, the amount of bid shading is limited to
only two bid levels. Therefore, smaller bid increments reduce the absolute amount
of bid shading as well as constraints on expressing value differences.
2.5 An example with four bid levels
To get a better sense of the equilibrium, consider an example with two bidders,




, 1) or ∆ = 1/3. Solving for an equilib-
rium yields a provisional winner’s critical valuations, x̂t(1) = 4/5, x̂t(0, 1) = 2/3,
x̂t(1, 1) = ∞ and x̂t(Hi3) = ∞ for any Hi3 ∈ Θ3. The bidding strategy of the
provisional winner is summarized in Table 2.2.
A bidder never bids above her valuation. In round 1, if a provisional winner
has a valuation less than 4/5, she will exit. To show how the ranking history
affects inference of the lower bound of an opponent’s valuation and bidding behavior,
consider bidder 1 with valuation x1 and bidder 2 with valuation x2 where x1 > x2 >
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4/5. Suppose she is a provisional winner in round 2. If the ranking history is
H12 = (0, 1), the fact that bidder 2 bids in round 1 implies that her valuation is
higher than 4/5 and thus she will bid in round 2. Since bidder 1 knows that bidder
2 will bid and her valuation is above the current clock price as well, it is a dominant
strategy to bid. In contrast, if the ranking history is H12 = (1, 1), bidder 1 infers
that bidder 2’s valuation is higher than 1/3. Bidder 1 thus exits and loses. Bidder 1
would have done better if the ranking history had been H12 = (0, 1). The allocation
in this case is inefficient.
This example shows that being a provisional loser provides a bidder a chance to
learn about her opponent’s valuation and that a ranking history affects a provisional
winner’s bidding strategy. It is this history dependence that makes the equilibrium
calculation so difficult. With four bid levels, the expected revenue is 0.278 which is
lower than that of the HRB auction, which is equal to 1/3.
2.6 Expected revenue with profit maximizing bidders
In this section, we continue to assume that there is a single item and two
bidders whose valuations are uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. There are T bid levels,
equally spaced. Since all bidders bid truthfully in the HRB auction, the expected
revenue is RHRB = 1/3.
Calculating an expected revenue of the LAB auction is tedious since all possible
histories and associated outcomes have to be considered. Thus, the problem grows
exponentially in the number of bid levels making derivation of an equilibrium with
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an arbitrary number of bid levels impossible. We however can calculate expected
revenue for small T . We also can calculate revenue in the limit as the number of
bid levels goes to infinity-bid increments become small. The limit result comes from
the limit of upper and lower bounds on revenue. Since both limits converge to the
same thing, the equilibrium expected revenue must converge as well.
Lemma 2.7. Suppose all bidders follow the straightforward strategy. For any T ≥ 3,
the expected revenue is given by
RSBLAB(T ) =





LAB(T ) = RHRB.
A rational bidder infers a lower bound of her opponent’s valuation from a
ranking history and a previous clock price. The inferred opponent’s valuation is
at the previous clock price unless a ranking history implies that it is higher. The
higher is the lower bound, the less is the bid shading. Consider a maximum shad-
ing strategy—in every round, a provisional winner infers that a lower bound of the
provisional loser’s valuation is a previous clock price. Therefore, the lowest infer-
ence of lower bound which leads to the highest amount of shading constitutes the
maximum shading strategy as the name suggests. Explicitly, consider a bidder with
valuation xt ∈ [Pt, Pt+1) where t ≥ 2. In any round s ≤ t− 2, she will bid regardless
of her ranking according to Lemma 2.6. In round t, if she is a provisional winner,
she will exit since πit(qit = 1, xi,Hit) ≡ (xi − Pt) ∆1−F (Pt−1) +
1
2
(xi − Pt) ∆1−F (Pt−1) <
(xi − Pt−1) ∆1−F (Pt−1) ≡ πit(qit = 0, xi,Hit). Given that she will exit in round t, in
54
round t− 1, we can calculate that x̂t−1(Hit) = Pt + 25∆.
Lemma 2.8. Suppose a provisional winner follows the maximum shading strategy
and a provisional loser follows a straightforward bidding strategy. For any T ≥ 5,
the expected revenue is given by
RMSLAB(T ) =





LAB(T ) = RHRB.
Proposition 2.5. The expected revenue of the LAB auction converges to that of an
HRB auction as bid increments become small—as the number of bid levels goes to
infinity.
The expected revenue of the LAB auction when bidders follow a straightfor-
ward bidding strategy is an upper bound and the expected revenue of the LAB
auction when a provisional winner follows a maximum shading strategy is a lower
bound of the expected revenue of the LAB auction with profit maximizing bidders.
Since the upper and lower bounds converge to 1/3, the expected revenue of the LAB
auction converges to 1/3 as well.
With profit maximizing bidders, the expected revenues of the LAB auction
with 4–7 bid levels are shown in Table 2.3. The expected revenue is increasing in
the number of bid levels at a decreasing rate. We conjecture that the LAB auction
always yields lower expected revenue than the HRB auction.
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Table 2.3: Expected revenue of LAB auction with 4-7 bid levels






2.7 Extension to bidders with an anticipated loser’s regret at prof-
itable prices
In this section, we extend the model to include the possibility that bidders’
anticipated regret of losing at profitable prices will cause them to bid more aggres-
sively than under pure profit maximization. Again we consider the case with two
bidders and a single item. Valuations are uniformly distributed on [0, 1] with T
equally spaced bid levels.
There is strong support for this view in first-price auctions (Engelbrecht-
Wiggans & Katok, 2007, 2008; Filiz-Ozbay & Ozbay, 2007; Delgado et al., 2008).
It seems plausible that the same behavioral bias-caring more about the negative
emotion coming from losing at profitable prices than the positive emotion of extra
profit from successful bid shading-may exist in the dynamic context. In a separate
paper, we examine this possibility in the experimental laboratory (Cramton et al.,
2009). Here we present the basic theory.
The behavioral theory posits that bidders systematically put too much weight
on profits lost from losing at profitable prices and too little weight on profits gained
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from successful bid shading. In our context it is the bids of a provisional winner
that are affected by this asymmetric treatment of profits, since only the provisional
winner has an incentive to bid below her valuation.
Define π̃it(qit, qjt, Rit) as bidder i’s payoff if the auction ends given that bidder
i submits qit, bidder j submits qjt and Rit is bidder i’s rank in round t. Recognizing
anticipated loser’s regret, we define bidder i’s payoff function as
π̃it(qit = 1, qjt = 0, Rit = 1) = xi − Pt
π̃it(qit = 0, qjt = 0, Rit = 1) = −αmax{0, Et[π̃i,t+1(qit = 1, qjt = 1, Rit = 1)]}
π̃it(qit = 0, qjt = 0, Rit = 1) = xi − Pt−1
π̃it(qit = 1, qjt = 0, Rit = 0) = xi − Pt
π̃it(qit = 0, qjt = 1, Rit = 0) = −αmax{0, Et[π̃i,t+1(qit = 1, qjt = 1, Rit = 0)]}
π̃it(qit = 0, qjt = 0, Rit = 0) = −αmax{0, Et[π̃i,t+1(qit = 1, qjt = 0, Rit = 0)]}
where α is the regret coefficient indicating the strength of anticipated regret. In this
section, assume that 0 ≤ α < 1.
Given this payoff structure, it is still a weakly dominant strategy for a pro-
visional loser to bid straightforwardly. Consider a provisional loser with a valua-
tion between Pt and Pt+1. In round t + 1, she could win only at an unprofitable
price by bidding. Hence, she does not have regret so she exits. Therefore, it is a
weakly-dominated strategy to bid above her valuation. Moreover, exiting below her
valuation is still a weakly-dominated strategy as doing so penalizes the bidder even
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more than in the no-regret case resulting in a negative expected payoff; whereas,
bidding yields a positive expected payoff.
For a provisional winner who faces a tradeoff between exiting and bidding,
exiting is now less attractive since she anticipates that she will regret if losing. A
provisional winner is expected to bid more aggressively when anticipated regret is
more intense.
Lemma 2.9. Suppose a provisional winner follows the maximum shading strategy
and a provisional loser follows the straightforward bidding strategy. For any T ≥ 5
and 0 ≤ α < 1, the expected revenue is given by
R̃MSLAB(T ) =
1
150(1 + α)2(T − 1)3
(
50T 3 − 195T 2 + 397− 549
+2α(50T 3 − 150T 2 + 163T − 171) + α2(50T 3 − 105T 2 − 23T − 9)
)
.
In addition, limT→∞ R̃
MS
LAB(T, α) = RHRB.
As in the no-regret case, R̃MSLAB(T, α) is a lower bound of the expected revenue
of the LAB auction with fear of losing. The upper bound is the same as the no-regret
case in Lemma 2.7. Therefore, the expected revenue of the LAB auction with fear
of losing converges to 1
3
.
Nonetheless, in the interesting case of finite T as in any real auction, if the
regret coefficient is sufficiently large, the LAB auction yields higher expected revenue
than the HRB auction. The necessary condition is given in Proposition 2.6.
Proposition 2.6. Suppose a provisional winner follows the maximum shading strat-
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egy and a provisional loser follows the straightforward bidding strategy. If T ≥ 7
and
121− 13T + 5
√
3(27T 4 − 252T 3 + 896T 2 − 1328T + 468)
45T 2 − 173T + 41
≤ α < 1,
then R̃MSLAB(T, α) ≥ RHRB.
Define α∗ as the critical regret coefficient such that R̃MSLAB(T, α
∗) = RHRB.
Figure 2.2 shows the relationship between the critical regret coefficient and the
number of bid levels. With six bid levels a regret coefficient of one guarantees that
the LAB auction yields higher revenue than the HRB auction. If T ≥ 7 and α is
sufficiently close to one, we can be certain that the expected revenue of the LAB
auction is higher. In Section 8, we show that the actual regret coefficient (as opposed
to the critical regret coefficient α∗) with six bid levels that makes the LAB and HRB
auctions have equal revenues is 0.66, not 1.
2.8 An example with four and six bid levels and fear of losing
By using a similar solution technique as used in Section 5, we can explicitly
calculate a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with fear of losing for a small number of bid
levels. Consider the case of four bid levels. A provisional winner’s bidding strategies
when 0 ≤ α < 1 and α ≥ 1 are as shown in Table 2.4 and 2.5, respectively.
The equilibrium strategy with α < 1 is similar to the no-regret case but the
critical valuation is instead a function of the regret coefficient. Moreover, in round
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Figure 2.2: Relationship between the critical regret coefficient and the
number of bid levels
Table 2.4: Valuation of a provisional winner whose optimal strategy is
bidding in each round and ranking history when 0 ≤ α < 1
Round Price Ranking History Value
1 1/3 (1) [2/3 + 2(1−α)
15(1+α)
, 1]
2 2/3 (1,1) None
(0,1) [2/3, 1]
3 1 Any None
Table 2.5: Valuation of a provisional winner whose optimal strategy is
bidding in each round and ranking history when α ≥ 1
Round Price Ranking History Value
1 1/3 (1) [1/3 + 2
3(1+α)
, 1]
2 2/3 (1,1) None
(0,1) [2/3, 1]
3 1 Any None
60
1 a provisional winner with any valuation below 2/3 exits if α < 1 but if α ≥ 1, a
provisional winner with valuation close to 2/3 may bid. In both cases, the larger
is the regret coefficient, the lesser is the amount of shading and the higher is the





; if 0 ≤ α < 1
11α3+27α2+25α+5
27(1+α)3
; if α ≥ 1
.
Similar calculations can be done for the case of six bid levels. Figure 2.3 plots the
expected revenue from the LAB auction with T = 4 (solid) and 6 (dashed) as a
function of the regret coefficient. Revenue increases with the fear of losing, and
exceeds the revenue of 1/3 from the HRB auction if the fear of losing is sufficiently
strong. The x-axis is drawn at 1/3, so points above the axis are instances where the
LAB auction yields higher revenues than the HRB auction. With four bid levels, the
LAB auction yields higher expected revenue than the HRB auction if α > 1.52; with
six bid levels, the LAB auction yields higher expected revenue than the HBR auction
if α > 0.66. Since six or more bid levels is typical in practice, we conclude that the
LAB auction may yield higher revenues than the HRB auction with plausible levels
of fear of losing.
2.9 Lowest-accepted bid with exit bids
Our version of lowest-accepted bid is motivated from India’s 3G auction. A
variation which may be preferable is the lowest-accepted bid with exit bids (LABx).
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Figure 2.3: Expected revenue of the LAB auction with fear of losing,
T = 4 and T = 6
This is identical to HRB in that exit bids are allowed, but the price is set by the
lowest-accepted bid, so there is a first-price incentive to shade one’s bid.1
Assume that there are N bidders whose valuations are distributed on the
interval [0, 1] with the distribution function F . If there is excess demand in any
round, the auction proceeds to the next round. If a bidder exits in round t, the
bidder can submit an exit bid—a price between Pt−1 and Pt. The final price is
determined by the lowest-accepted exit bid. That is, in round t such that Qt = K,
the auction ends and the final price is Pt and the items are awarded to active bidders.
If Qt < K, the K −Qt-highest exit bid determines the final price and the items are
awarded to the active bidders and exiting bidders with the highest K−Qt exit bids.
Let Mt = (M1,M2, . . . ,Mt) be a vector indicating the number of active bidders
from round 1 to round t where Mt ∈ {2, . . . , N} is the number of active bidders in
1Another variation is the pricing rule analyzed in Rothkopf and Harstad (1994) and David et al.
(2007). Moreover, such pricing rule is dominated in both revenue and efficiency by highest-rejected







𝑥𝑡−1∗ (𝑴𝑡−1) 𝑥𝑡∗(𝑴𝑡) 𝑥𝑡+1∗ (𝑴𝑡+1)
𝑃𝑡−1 𝑃𝑡  𝑃𝑡+1 𝑃𝑡+2 
Figure 2.4: Equilibrium Bidding strategy in the LABx auction
round t and M1 ≥ M2 ≥ . . . ≥ Mt. Let Ωt = {Mt|M1 ≥ M2 ≥ . . . ≥ Mt} be the
set of all possible active bidder histories from round 1 to round t. Assume that the
active bidder history Mt is common knowledge.
Given the history, the bidder forms a belief of a lower bound of active bidders’
valuations and chooses whether to bid or submit an exit bid accordingly. Since it is
a dominated strategy to bid above one’s valuation, the lower bound is at least the
previous clock price.
Let x∗t : [0,∞) ×Ωt → [0, 1] be an intermediate valuation in round t given a
regret coefficient and active bidder history. Let Bt : [0, 1]× [0,∞)×Ωt → [Pt−1, Pt)
be an equilibrium exit bid function in round t given a valuation, regret coefficient and
a history of the number of active bidders. An equilibrium bidding strategy is defined
by these two functions. That is, a bidder with valuation x ∈ [x∗t−1(α,Mt−1, x∗t (α,Mt)
exits in round t and submits an exit bid Bt(x, α,Mt). The equilibrium bidding
strategy is illustrated in Figure 2.4.
Both x∗t (α,Mt) and Bt(x, α,Mt) can be derived iteratively from round 1 to
round T . In any round t and any Mt ∈ Ωt, bidders infer that their opponents’
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valuations are in [x∗t−1(α,Mt−1, 1]. The exit bid function is






where zt = x
∗
t−1(α,Mt−1) and G(s|zt) = F (s|zt)Mt−1.
The critical valuation x∗t (α,Mt) ≡ x∗ can be obtained by solving the condition
B̃t(x
∗, α, x∗t−1(α,Mt−1),Mt) = Pt. Note that the equilibrium exit bid function can
be rewritten as Bt(x, α,Mt) ≡ B̃t(x, α, x∗t−1(α,Mt−1),Mt).
Proposition 2.7. A symmetric equilibrium of LABx auction is characterized by
critical valuation x∗t (α,Mt) and exit bid function Bt(x, α,Mt) for t = 1, 2, . . . , T −1
and for any Mt ∈ Ωt. Define x∗0(α, ∅). In round t with a history Mt ∈ Ωt, a bidder
with valuation x ∈ [x∗t−1(α,Mt−1), x∗t (α,Mt)) exits in round t and submits an exit
bid equal to Bt(x, α,Mt). For t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1 and for any Mt ∈ Ωt, x∗t (α,Mt)
is decreasing in α and Bt(x, α,Mt) is increasing in x and α.
Proposition 2.8. The LABx auction is efficient.
Because the bidding strategy is monotonic in valuation and symmetric, the
allocation is efficient. The use of exit bids overcomes both the inefficiency arising
from discrete bid levels and the asymmetry created by ranking.
Proposition 2.9. Revenue equivalence between HRB and LABx auctions holds if
α = 0. If α > 0, the LABx auction yields higher revenue than the HRB auction.
Since the allocation rules and expected payoffs of the lowest-valuation bidder of
the HRB and LABx auctions are the same, revenue equivalence immediately follows
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Table 2.6: Bidding strategy of the LABx auction with four bid levels and
fear of losing






















when α = 0. In contrast to the HRB auction, in the LABx auction, bidders submit
exit bids below their valuations so that fear of losing at a profitable price impacts
the bidding strategy in the LABx auction. Similar to the first-price auction, this
fear of losing reduces the amount of shading resulting in higher exit bids relative to
the α = 0 case and thus implying higher expected revenue.
2.10 An example of the LABx auction with four bid levels and fear
of losing
Assume that there are two bidders and each bidder’s valuation is uniformly
distributed over an interval [0, 1]. In the two-bidder case, an active bidder history
is irrelevant since the auction ends when any bidder exits. The equilibrium bidding
strategy is given in Table 2.6.
If α = 0 and both bidders bid in round 1, it implies that both bidders have
valuations in [2/3, 1] and thus no bidder exits in round 2. The expected revenue
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T = 4 exit
T = 6 exit
T = 6 no exit
T = 4 no exit
Figure 2.5: revenue of the LAB and LABx auctions with fear of losing,
T = 4 and T = 6
when α > 0 is given as follows.
R̃LABx(4, α) =
13α7 + 98α6 + 314α5 + 553α4 + 580α3 + 361α2 + 124α + 18
27(2 + α)(1 + α)6
Expected revenues of the LAB and LABx auctions with fear of losing with four
and six bid levels are shown in Figure 2.5. As the number of bid levels increases, the
expected revenue when α > 0 decreases. This is because LABx converges to HRB
as the number of bid levels goes to infinity. The LABx auction achieves maximum
revenues when the number of bid levels is set to two; that is, the first-price sealed-bid
auction achieves the maximum revenues when bidders fear losing.
2.11 Conclusion
The pricing rule is of fundamental importance in practical auction design. It
is now well understood that the pricing rule impacts both the efficiency and the
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revenues of the auction. Although there is an immense literature on the pricing rule
in static (sealed-bid) auctions-first-price vs. second-price in single-unit auctions and
pay-as-bid vs. uniform-price in multi-unit auctions-little is known about alternative
pricing rules in dynamic auctions. This paper begins to fill that gap.
We find that the highest-rejected-bid auction with exit bids (HRB auction) is
superior in both efficiency and revenues to the lowest-accepted-bid with provisional
winners (LAB auction) when bidders seek to maximize profits. Given this, it may
seem odd that India, with a stated objective of revenue maximization, chose the
LAB auction.
Behavioral economics provides a plausible explanation for the choice. With the
LAB auction, profit maximizing bidders engage in bid shading and therefore face the
risk of losing at profitable prices. Bidders who fear losing at profitable prices reduce
their bid shading to lessen this risk. Provided the fear of losing is sufficiently strong,
the LAB auction revenues exceed those of the HRB auction. Thus, the LAB auction
may achieve India’s primary objective of maximizing revenues. However, the lowest-
accepted bid with exit bids (LABx) is strictly superior to LAB in all cases in both
revenue and efficiency. The use of exit bids eliminates both sources of inefficiency
in the LAB auction—discrete bid levels and asymmetric bidding strategies caused
by provisional winners.
In Cramton et al. (2009), we conducted laboratory experiments to test the
theory. The experiments confirm bidding behavior consistent with a significant
loser’s regret coefficient. Both the LAB and LABx auction achieve significantly
higher revenues than the HRB auction. Consistent with the theory, bidders in the
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HRB auction tend to bid true values and the efficiency and revenue are as predicted
by the theory. With LAB and LABx auctions, the bidders engage in much less bid
shading than is seen in the standard theory without a fear of losing. This accounts
for the significantly higher revenues under the lowest-accepted bid pricing rule.
Despite the possibility of higher revenues from the LAB format, we would
recommend against its use in India or elsewhere. If there are revenue gains, the
gains likely are modest (and tightly bounded as we have shown). Offsetting these
potential revenue gains are inefficiencies. One source of inefficiency, which we have
ignored so far, is bidder participation costs. As we have seen, bidding strategy
in the LAB auction is incredibly complex even in the simplest cases. In sharp
contrast, bidding strategy in the HRB auction is simple in simple settings: a bidder
of modest size and with additive values across regions, which is often a good first
approximation, can bid straightforwardly, raising the bid on each region until the
bidder’s value is reached. The great complexity of bidding strategy under the LAB
format is an important reason to favor the strategically simpler and more efficient
HRB format.
Our view is that India would be better off in the long-run if it focused on
efficient auctions. Efficient auctions are much simpler for bidders and still raise
substantial revenues. The long-run revenues of the state are apt to be highest from a
policy that promotes the rapid and efficient development of wireless communications.
Auction revenues are only one piece of the overall revenues. For a country like India,
the much more important piece is the promise of long-term sustainable growth. The





Discrete Clock Auctions: An Experimental Study
3.1 Introduction
A common method to auction radio spectrum, electricity, gas, and other prod-
ucts is the discrete clock auction. The auctioneer names a price and each bidder
responds with her desired quantity. If there is excess demand, the auctioneer then
names a higher price. The process continues until there is no excess demand.
Discrete rounds are used in practice to simplify communication, make the
process robust to communication failures, and mitigate tacit collusion (Ausubel &
Cramton, 2004). An implication of discrete rounds is that the pricing rule matters.
The two most common pricing rules are lowest-accepted bid and highest-rejected
bid. Another issue is whether the bidder can specify an exit bid-a price less than
the current price at which the bidder desires to reduce quantity. In the limit as
the size of the bid increment goes to zero, the distinction between pricing rules is
irrelevant and exit bids are unnecessary. However, in practical auctions where the
number of rounds often ranges from 4 to 10, discreteness matters.
In this paper, we examine bidding behavior under three versions of a discrete
clock auction. In each version, after each round the bidders learn the aggregate
demand. To prevent bid-sniping, an activity rule requires that a bidder’s quantity
demanded cannot increase at higher prices. Bidders can only maintain or reduce
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quantity as the price rises. The three versions differ in the pricing rule and whether
bidders make exit bids to express the price at which a quantity reduction is desired.
Highest-rejected bid (HRB). If the bidder reduces quantity in a round, the
bidder names a price for each quantity reduction. The price of each reduction must
be greater than the prior price and less than or equal to the current price. Each exit
price is interpreted as the price at which the bidder is indifferent between the higher
quantity and the lower quantity. If there is no excess demand at the current price,
the supply is awarded to the highest bidders, and each winner pays the highest-
rejected bid for the quantity won. The clearing price is the lowest price consistent
with market clearing-the price at which supply equals demand.
Lowest-accepted bid (LAB). This is the same as HRB, except that the winners
pay the lowest-accepted bid for the quantity won. The clearing price is the highest
price consistent with market clearing.
Lowest-accepted bid with provisional winners (LABpw). This is the same as
LAB, except there are no exit bids. Instead after each round, provisional winners
are determined. Those with the highest price bid are selected first, and, in the event
of a tie, the remaining provisional winners are selected at random.
The clock auction is best thought of as a dynamic version of a sealed-bid
uniform-price auction. In the uniform-price auction, the auctioneer collects a de-
mand curve from each bidder, forms the aggregate demand curve, and crosses it with
the supply curve to determine the market clearing price and the quantity won by
each bidder. The clock auction does the same thing, but gathers the demand curves
from each bidder in a sequence of discrete rounds, and bidders receive information
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about excess demand at the end of each round. The uniform-price auction is just
a single-round clock auction. In both clock auctions and uniform-price auctions,
two pricing rules are commonly used: highest-rejected bid and lowest-accepted bid.
This is the motivation for our HRB and LAB treatments.
The LAB rule is used in US Treasury auctions, as well as Treasury auctions
in many other countries. These are sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. In contrast,
clock auctions for electricity and gas products in Europe have used the HRB rule.
Our third treatment, lowest-accepted bid with provisional winners, is a version
of the simultaneous ascending auction commonly used to auction radio spectrum.
The government of India used this format for its 2010 3G spectrum auction. Similar
approaches have been used elsewhere, such as in Italy’s 3G spectrum auction.
At first glance, it would seem that selecting the highest clearing price (LAB)
would result in greater revenue than selecting the lowest clearing price (HRB). The
argument is incomplete, since the pricing rule influences behavior. LAB provides a
stronger incentive for shading one’s bid below valuation. In simple cases (assuming
symmetry, independence, and risk neutrality), the greater bid shading under LAB
exactly offsets the revenue gain from selecting the higher clearing price. Revenue
equivalence obtains, and the two pricing rules result in the same expected revenue-at
least in theory when bidders seek to maximize profits.
It is a robust and puzzling finding of the experimental literature that in second-
price sealed-bid auctions subjects bid more than their value although they bid truth-
fully in its dynamic counterpart, the English auction (Cooper & Fang, 2008; Cop-
pinger et al., 1980; Kagel et al., 1987; Kagel & Levin, 1993). The HRB auction
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is somewhere between the English and second-price auctions and these two are the
limit cases of HRB. HRB converges to the English auction (continuous clock) when
the number of rounds approaches to infinity. When there is only one round, HRB
is the same as the second price auction. The exit bid decision in HRB requires sim-
ilar strategic thinking as in a second-price sealed-bid auction. On the other hand,
whether to stay in the auction is the same binary decision as in the English auc-
tion. Harstad (2000) finds that experience with the English auction leads to less
overbidding in second-price auctions. Moreover, he argues that the binary choice
aspect of English auctions explains an important part of this learning. The HRB
format allows subjects to make that kind of binary choice for early price increments
and when they come to the price interval when they want to exit, they have this
experience. In this respect, studying discrete clock auctions helps us understand
what makes subjects overbid in second-price auctions and bid truthfully in English
auctions.
Since we find experimentally that subjects do not deviate from the straightfor-
ward bidding strategy in HRB, it is confirmed that dynamic formats make it easier
for the bidders to recognize equilibrium strategies. Having a discrete clock makes
HRB more practical than the English auction, and yet it still is successful in eliciting
the true values in our experiment.
The LAB pricing rule is analogous to a first-price sealed-bid auction. In par-
ticular, if there is only one round and one good, the LAB and first price auctions are
the same. Another robust finding of the experimental literature is that bidders of a
first-price auction overbid compared to the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium prediction
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(Cox et al., 1982, 1988; Kagel & Levin, 2008)1. Therefore, we expect to see some
sort of overbidding in LAB auction.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the bidding behavior and outcomes,
especially efficiency and revenue, under the three different formats experimentally.
Our main hypothesis is that subjects will overbid under lowest-accepted bid, con-
sistent with the first-price sealed-bid auction; whereas, under highest-rejected bid,
bidders will bid truthfully. Thus, revenues under LAB will be higher than revenues
under HRB. However, efficiency will be higher under HRB, as a result of the truthful
bidding. Although the formats apply to the general case of auctioning many units
of multiple products, for simplicity we restrict attention to the case of auctioning a
single good.
Our results indicate that revenues under both LAB and LABpw are signifi-
cantly higher than under HRB. Thus, in settings where revenue is the predominant
objective, the seller may favor LAB, but in settings where both efficiency and sim-
plicity are of greater concern, then the seller may favor HRB.
There are a number of experimental papers that use clock auctions. Some of
these papers use a continuous clock (Kagel & Levin, 2001). Others use a discrete
clock, and compare a sealed-bid auction with a particular discrete clock (Ausubel et
al., 2009). This paper aims to understand the implications of different pricing rules
in discrete clock auctions.
In Section 3.2, we begin with a presentation of the theory. Equilibrium bidding
1Risk aversion offers one explanation, but this has proven inadequate (Kagel, 1995). Several
papers explain the overbidding phenomena with behavioral motives (Goeree et al., 2002; Crawford
& Iriberri, 2007; Delgado et al., 2008; Filiz-Ozbay & Ozbay, 2007; Lange & Ratan, 2010)
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strategies for the three versions of the discrete clock auction are characterized in
Cramton and Sujarittanonta (2010). Here we summarize the results, and provide
the equilibrium for bidding strategies for our experimental setting. The experimental
design and the results are discussed in Sections 3.3 and 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Theory
There is one indivisible good for sale to N > 1 risk neutral bidders. Bidder
i’s private value for the good is vi where each vi is independently drawn from a
commonly know distribution F . Bidder i’s payoff if she wins the good at a price p
is vi − p. Otherwise, it is equal to 0. The seller values the good at 0.
Before the auction starts, the seller announces a vector of bid levels, P =
(P0, P1, . . . , PT−1) where Pt is the price at round t and T is the number of bid levels.
The clock price increases every round so that v = P0 < P1 < · · · < PT−1 = v̄. The
auction begins in round one at a price P1.
In each round t, each bidder chooses either to bid at the current clock price
or to exit. Once a bidder exits she cannot bid again. If both bidders stay in, the
auction proceeds to the next round. If one bidder exits, then the bidder who stayed
in wins the good. The resolution of the other cases and the payments will depend
on the auction format.
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3.2.1 Highest-rejected-bid (HRB)
In the HRB format, the final price is determined by the highest-rejected bid.
If a bidder exits in round t, the bidder submits an exit bid—a price between Pt−1
and Pt at which she wants to exit. If more than one bidder remains, the auction
continues to another round; if all but one bidder exits, the remaining bidder wins
and pays the highest exit bid; if all bidders exit, the bidder with the highest exit
bid wins and pays the second-highest exit bid.
Proposition 3.1. In the HRB auction, truthful bidding (bidding up to one’s value)
is a weakly-dominant strategy. The HRB auction is efficient and maximizes seller
revenue.
The dominant strategy result is standard and holds regardless of the number
of bidders, the number of goods, or how values are drawn. All that is required is that
each bidder demands only a single good. Thus, highest-rejected bid is the Vickrey
price, thereby inducing truthful bidding. Efficiency is an immediate implication of
truthful bidding.
The HRB auction has extremely desirable properties in our setting. It is both
efficient and maximizes seller revenues. Moreover, the bidding strategy is simple—
just bid up to your true value—and is best regardless of what the other bidders are
doing. Another important property of the HRB auction is that a bidder cannot lose
at an affordable price as long as she bids her value. Hence, neither the winner nor
the loser ever regrets having bid as they bid. The winner could not do better by
exiting earlier; the loser could not do better by staying in longer.
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3.2.2 Lowest-accepted-bid (LAB)
In the LAB format, the final price is determined by the lowest-accepted bid.
If a bidder exits in round t, the bidder submits an exit bid-a price between Pt−1
and Pt at which she wants to exit. If more than one bidder remains, the auction
continues to another round; if all but one bidder exits, the remaining bidder wins
and pays the current price; if all bidders exit, the bidder with the highest exit bid
wins and pays her exit bid.
Proposition 3.2. In the symmetric equilibrium of the LAB auction (see Table 3.1),
a bidder, who exits bid at Pt, bids b(vi, Pt−1) = E[Y |Pt−1 < Yk < vi] where Yk is the
highest of k − 1 independently drawn values and k is the number of bidders present
at Pt−1. The LAB auction is efficient and maximizes seller revenue.
The LAB auction in our setting is efficient and maximizes seller revenues.
Nonetheless, one might favor the HRB auction because of its simple bidding strategy
without bid shading. In the LAB auction, bidders must do a difficult equilibrium
calculation to determine the optimal level of bid shading.
3.2.3 Lowest-accepted-bid with provisional winners (LABpw)
Our third version of the discrete clock auction has provisional winners instead
of exit bids. This approach is common in spectrum auctions, and was used in the
2010 India 3G spectrum auction. It is theoretically investigated in Cramton and
Sujarittanonta (2010).
With two bidders, one of the bidders is selected at random as the provisional
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winner at the reservation price P0. In each round, each bidder chooses either to bid
at the current price or to exit. If both bidders stay in, one of the bidders is selected
at random as the provisional winner and the auction proceeds to the next round. If
one bidder exits, then the bidder who stayed in wins the good at the current price.
If both bidders exit, then the provisional winner wins the good at the prior price.
An important difference between the auction described here and a standard
ascending-bid auction is a provisional winner must keep topping her own bid in order
to be eligible to bid in subsequent rounds. In contrast, in a standard ascending-bid
auction, a provisional winner does not need to bid, since if her bid is topped, she
can still bid in the next round.
Proposition 3.3. In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the LABpw auction, the
provisional loser stays in provided her value is not yet reached; the provisional winner
exits at a level below her true value. The exit level depends on the provisional winning
history. The outcome is inefficient and does not maximize seller revenue.
The LABpw auction uses provisional winners, rather than exit bids, to deter-
mine who wins in the event both bidders exit in the same round. This creates two
sources of inefficiency. First, without exit bids, there is no precise value information
to determine who has the higher value. Second, the provisional winner designation
creates differential bid shading (provisional winners shade bids, whereas provisional
losers do not). Since in our setting there is no conflict between efficiency and revenue
maximization, it is clear that the LABpw auction does not maximize seller revenue.
The seller should favor HRB or LAB on both efficiency and revenue grounds. In
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Table 3.1: Equilibrium Strategy for LAB auction
Value Exit Round Exit bid function
[50, 70) 1 25 + 1
2
vi
[70, 90) 3 35 + 1
2
vi
[90, 100] 5 45 + 1
2
vi
addition, the equilibrium strategies in LABpw are greatly complicated by history
dependence.
3.2.4 Theoretical predictions for the experiment
In our experiment, two bidders compete to buy a single good. Bidder i’s
private value for the good is vi where each vi is independently drawn from the
uniform distribution on [50, 100] and p = (50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100). By Proposition
3.1, in HRB the bidder submits her value as an exit bid. By Proposition 3.2, the
equilibrium strategy is given in Table 3.1.
Ex ante symmetry-the fact that the bidders’ values are drawn from the same
distribution-is critical for Proposition 3.2. This allows for a symmetric equilibrium.
Since the exit bid functions are the same and strictly increasing, the bidder with the
highest value wins and the outcome is efficient. Revenue maximization then follows
from the revenue equivalence theorem. The assignment is the same as in the HRB
auction, and both auctions give the bidder with a value of 50 a payoff of 0.
In LABpw, the provisional loser stays in provided her value is not yet reached;
the exit strategy for the provisional winner is given in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.2: Provisional Winner’s Equilibrium Strategy for LABpw auction
Round Historya Critical Valueb
1 (1) 74
2 (1, 1) 84
(0, 1) 70
3 (1, 1, 1) 94
(0, 1, 1) 90.8
(0, 0, 1) 80
4 (1, 0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 0, 1) and (0, 0, 0, 1) 90
Otherwise 100
5 Any 100
a History vector denotes whether the bidder is a provisional
winner (denoted by 1) or not (denoted by 0) in all the rounds
up to the current round.
b Critical Value denotes the threshold such that the bidder
stays in if her value is above the corresponding threshold.
3.3 Experimental method
The experiments were run at the Experimental Economics Lab at the Univer-
sity of Maryland. All participants were undergraduate students at the University of
Maryland. The experiment involved six sessions. In each session one of the three
treatments was administered. The numbers of participants in each treatment were
30 (HRB), 32 (LAB), and 30 (LABpw). No subject participated in more than one
session. Participants were seated in isolated booths. Each session lasted about 80
minutes. Bidder instructions for each treatment are in the Appendix C. To test each
subject’s understanding of the instructions, the subject had to answer a sequence
of multiple choice questions. The auctions did not begin until the subject answered
all of the multiple choice questions correctly.
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In each session, each subject participated in 21 auctions. The first auction
was a practice auction. Each auction had two bidders, selected at random among
the subjects. Bidders were randomly rematched after each auction. All bidding was
anonymous. Bids were entered via computer. The experiment is programmed in
z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). At the conclusion of each auction, the bidder learned
whether she won and the price paid by the winning bidder.
Bidders had independent private values for a fictitious good. All values were
uniformly distributed between 50 and 100, rounded to the nearest cent. Both bidders
were IN at the starting price of 50. The price increased by 10 if both bidders stayed
IN the prior round. Thus, the possible price levels in each auction were 50, 60, 70,
80, 90, and 100. There were a maximum of five rounds in the discrete clock auction.
The auction concluded as soon as a round was reached in which one or both bidders
stayed OUT.
Treatment HRB. In each round, the computer asks the bidder if she is IN or
OUT at the current price. If the bidder stays OUT, the bidder must specify an exit
bid between the current price and the prior price. If the bidder stays IN and the
opponent stays OUT, then the bidder wins and pays the opponent’s exit bid. If
the bidder stays OUT and the opponent stays IN, then the opponent wins at the
bidder’s exit bid. If both stay OUT, then the bidder with the higher exit bid wins
and pays the smaller of the exit bids. If both stay IN, then the price increases by
10 and the auction continues to the next round.
Treatment LAB. In each round, the computer asks the bidder if she is IN or
OUT at the current price. If the bidder stays OUT, the bidder must specify an
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exit bid between the current price and the prior price. If the bidder stays IN and
the opponent stays OUT, then the bidder wins and pays her exit bid. If the bidder
stays OUT and the opponent stays IN, then the opponent wins and pays her exit
bid. If both stay OUT, then the bidder with the higher exit bid wins and pays her
exit bid. If both stay IN, then the price increases by 10 and the auction continues
to the next round.
Treatment LABpw. One of the bidders is selected at random as the provisional
winner at the price of 50. In each round, the computer asks the bidder if she is IN
or OUT at the current price. If the bidder stays IN and the opponent stays OUT,
then the bidder wins and pays the current price. If the bidder stays OUT and the
opponent stays IN, then the opponent wins at the current price. If both stay OUT,
then the provisional winner of the prior round wins and pays the prior round price.
If both stay IN, then one of the bidders is selected at random as the provisional
winner at the current price, price increases by 10 and the auction continues to the
next round.
The winner in each auction earned her value minus the price paid in Exper-
imental Currency Units (ECU). At the end of the experiment, total earnings were
converted to US Dollars, at the conversion rate of 10 ECU = 1 US Dollar. Subjects
also received a $5 show-up fee. Cash payments were made at the conclusion of the
experiment. The average subject payment was $19.77.
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Table 3.3: Outcomes of treatment HRB, LAB and LABpw
HRB LAB LABpw
Frequency of efficient allocation 92.0% 90.3% 85.3%
(1.57) (1.65) (2.04)
Revenue per auction 67.35 69.85 69.33
(0.70) (0.60) (0.65)
Seller’s share of gains from trade 80.8% 84.8% 85.3%
(0.86) (0.71) (0.77)
Theoretical revenue per auction 67.06% 67.12% 65.27%
Number of auctions 300 320 300
Standard errors are shown in the parentheses.
3.4 Experimental results
As in any dynamic auction, bidding strategies of all bidders are not observable.
For example, in the Dutch auction only the bid of the winner, or in the English
auction only the bids of the losers are observable. Nonetheless, it is still possible
to make revenue and efficiency comparisons, which are important in auction design.
Later, we will study the bidding strategies based on the observable bids.
Table 3.3 shows the outcomes of each treatment. Treatment HRB, LAB and
LABpw consist of 300, 320 and 300 auctions, respectively. Treatments HRB and
LAB, which are theoretically efficient, yield the efficient allocation with a frequency
of 92% and 90.3%, respectively. Treatment LABpw yields the efficient allocation
85.3% of the time. Using the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, LABpw is significantly
less efficient than HRB (z = 2.57, p = 0.01), but there is no significant difference
between LAB and HRB (z = 0.74, p = 0.46).
On the other hand, treatment LAB and LABpw yield higher revenues than
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Figure 3.1: Actual and theoretical seller’s share of gains from trade per
auction
HRB (Table 3.3). The revenue results are robust even if we consider the seller’s
share of the gains from trade (the ratio of the price and winner’s value) which can be
thought of as the proxy for the revenues. Treatment HRB gives the seller a smaller
share of the gains from trade than treatment LAB and LABpw. The Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test shows LAB and LABpw yield significantly higher seller’s share
than HRB (z = −3.28, p < 0.01 and z = −3.25, p < 0.01, respectively).
Figure 3.1 compares actual (what we observed in the experiment) and theoret-
ical seller’s share of the gains from trade per auction. Theoretical seller’s share is the
equilibrium seller’s share given the realization of values. The actual seller’s share of
HRB is not significantly different from the theoretical prediction (t = 0.41, p = 0.68),
but actual seller’s share of LAB and LABpw are significantly higher than the theo-
retical share (t = 4.51, p < 0.01 and t = 6.27, p < 0.01). This evidence implies that
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Figure 3.2: Average differences between actual and theoretical revenues
per period
subjects bid more aggressively than the equilibrium prediction and as a result the
seller receives higher revenue. These aggressive bidding behaviors are investigated
in the next subsections.
Figure 3.2 plots the average differences between the actual and theoretical
revenues period by period. The revenues we observed in the HRB are close to the
prediction of the theory, however the actual revenues are higher than the theoretical
ones both in LAB and in LABpw. These results suggest that the subjects follow a
truthtelling strategy in HRB, but they overbid in LAB and LABpw. Next, we will
study the bidding strategies in detail.
3.4.1 Bidding behavior in treatment HRB
Figure 3.3 plots exit bids and corresponding values in HRB. The dashed line
is a truthful bid function. To further examine bidding behavior, we estimate regres-
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sions of exit bids on values with bidder fixed effects, clustered by bidder. Subjects
submitted a total of 342 exit bids. The deviation from truthful bidding is on average
close to zero but there are instances of bid shading and bidding above one’s value. 83
percent of exit bids were submitted in the round that theory predicts. The vast ma-
jority of subjects were successful in waiting until the right round to exit. Since the
binary decision of staying in or out is similar to the strategic thinking of the English
auction, this finding is in line with the success of value bidding in English auction
experiments. (Harstad, 2000) finds that subjects who gain experience in auctions
with this kind of binary decision making perform better in discovering the value
bidding strategy in second-price sealed-bid auctions. Staying in the HRB auction
until the price reaches the correct level provides a similar experience as participating
in an English auction. Hence, once a subject reaches that round her exit bid is close
to the true value. In line with this argument, the deviations from truthful bidding
diminish for higher valuations. The reason might be that a bidder with high value
makes more binary decisions before the price reaches her value and this helps her
discover equilibrium exit bids.
We regress exit bid on value with subject fixed effects, clustered by subject.
The regression results are shown in Table 3.4. We cannot reject the null hypothesis
that the coefficient of value is equal to one.
Table 3.5 shows the averages of the ratios of exit bids to values for each period.
We observed 15 to 20 exit bids in each period. As the ratios in all periods are close
to one, subjects on average bid truthfully throughout the experiment.
86
Figure 3.3: Plot between values and exit bids in HRB auction







* Significant at 95% confi-
dence interval. Standard er-
rors are shown in the paren-
theses. Sample size is 342.
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Table 3.5: Average ratio of exit bid to value by period in HRB auction
Period Exit bid/value Period Exit bid/value
1 0.98 (0.04) 11 1.00 (0.04)
2 0.98 (0.04) 12 1.00 (0.04)
3 0.99 (0.07) 13 1.00 (0.05)
4 1.00 (0.08) 14 1.00 (0.04)
5 0.97 (0.05) 15 1.01 (0.05)
6 0.98 (0.02) 16 1.00 (0.05)
7 0.99 (0.03) 17 1.01 (0.03)
8 0.99 (0.03) 18 1.01 (0.04)
9 1.00 (0.04) 19 1.00 (0.04)
10 1.00 (0.05) 20 0.99 (0.02)
Standard deviations are shown in the parenthe-
ses.
3.4.2 Bidding behavior in treatment LAB
A total of 386 exit bids were submitted in LAB. The actual seller’s share of
gains from trade per auction is significantly higher than the theoretical prediction.
This is the case because subjects bid more aggressively than the theory predicted as
shown in Figure 3.4. We consider an exit bid as equilibrium bidding if it is within
1 percent of the theoretical prediction, otherwise as overbidding or underbidding.
Starting from the first period, overbidding is observed and it is persistent throughout
the experiment. 66 percent of exit bids lie above the theoretical exit bid.
3.4.3 Bidding behavior in treatment LABpw
A total of 367 exit decisions are observed. As predicted by the theory (Propo-
sitions 3.3), provisional losers tended to stay in until value was reached (only 11
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Figure 3.4: Percentage of over-, under-, equilibrium-bidding per period
in LAB auction
violations out of 600 auctions). Additionally, similar to treatment LAB, aggressive
bidding behavior in treatment LABpw is observed, as indicated by the higher rev-
enue than the theoretical prediction and a mean exit price that is higher than the
theoretical exit price. Figure 3.5 shows a histogram of differences between the actual
and theoretical exit round. There are 91 instances of bidders staying in extra rounds
versus 33 instances of bidders exiting early compared with the theory. In addition,
among 233 active bidders at the end of the auction, 18 bidders bid more than value.
It was mostly the provisional winners who failed to follow the equilibrium.
3.4.4 Learning
All auction formats are played 20 periods. In order to see if there is any
difference between bidders’ early and late plays, and whether learning is taking place,
we compare the actual and theoretical exit bids throughout the experiment. We
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Figure 3.5: Histogram of differences between actual and theoretical exit
rounds in LABpw
measure the deviations from equilibrium by the absolute percentage deviation: the
absolute value of the difference between actual and theoretical exit bid divided by the
theoretical exit bid for each auction. Figure 3.6 shows average absolute percentage
deviations by period. Figure 3.6 suggests that bids in HRB and LAB auctions do
not change much as bidders gain experience. HRB deviations are within 4 percent
of the theoretical exit bids from the beginning of the session. LAB deviations do
not vary much over time either. However, the deviations in LAB are consistently
higher than in HRB. Absolute percentage deviations in LABpw are the highest, and
show some tendency to decline over time, especially in the final five periods. Since
provisional losers are successful in discovering equilibrium strategy, the variation in
Figure 3.6 in LABpw is due to deviations of the provisional winners.
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Figure 3.6: Average absolute deviation by period
3.5 Conclusion
The pricing rule is of fundamental importance in practical auction design.
Pricing impacts both the efficiency and the revenues of the auction. Although there
is an immense literature on the pricing rule in static (sealed-bid) auctions-first-price
vs. second-price in single unit auctions and pay-as-bid vs. uniform-price in multi-
unit auctions-little is known about alternative pricing rules in dynamic auctions
commonly used in practice. We show how different pricing rules influence bidding
behavior in discrete clock auctions in a simple setting.
Based on the standard theory in which bidders seek to maximize profits,
the highest-rejected-bid (HRB) and the lowest accepted-bid (LAB) auctions seem
equally good. They maximize revenues and are fully efficient in our unit-demand
setting. Despite this theoretical result, LAB pricing is often used in practice. In
our experiments, the LAB auction, both with and without exit bids, yielded higher
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revenues than the HRB auction. The HRB auction did better on efficiency grounds
than LAB with provisional winner, but not significantly so when compared to LAB.
Although there is a significant overbidding in LAB, this overbidding is not as severe
as LAB’s limit case, first-price sealed-bid auction. Perhaps, the dynamic nature of
LAB enables bidders to handle the complex bidding strategies. It may be inter-
esting to study the discrete clock auctions by varying the number of rounds and
price increments. This may enable us to understand better the overbidding puzzle
in sealed-bid auctions.
Developing strategies in HRB requires two things: when to exit as in an English
auction, and what exit bid to submit as in a second-price sealed bid auction. Bidders
submit exit bids close to their valuations. The tendency of bidding above value found
in second-price auctions is not observed here. We conjecture that this is due to the
experience bidders gain in deciding whether to exit each round. That thinking
process is similar to decision making in an English auction. Harstad (2000) finds
that practicing English auctions improves performance in second-price sealed-bid
auctions. Similarly, our experiment shows that the multiple-round implementation
of the second-price auction eliminates the tendency to overbid when faced with
second-price incentives. The dynamic implementation also limits the spread between
the highest bid and the price to at most one bid increment.
In situations like spectrum auctions where efficiency is the most important
objective rather than revenue, we recommend the HRB auction since it achieves the
efficient outcome with a simple value-bidding strategy. On the other hand, bidding
strategy in the LAB auction is complex even in the simplest cases.
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Appendix A
Missing proofs from Chapter 1
Proof of Proposition 1.1. According to Definition 1.3, incentive compatibility
implies that ũi(xi) = maxzi∈Xi q̃i(zi)xi− t̃i(zi). So, ũi(xi) is a convex function. With
envelope theorem, ũ′i(xi) = q̃i(xi). That is, the slope of ũi(xi) is q̃i(xi). Convexity
of ũi(·) implies that q̃i(·) is non-decreasing. Suppose µi(α) = mis and µi(β) = mit
where α, β ∈ Xi, α > β, mis,mit ∈ Mi and s 6= t. Since q̃i(·) is non-decreasing,
q̃i(α) = qi(µi(α)) = qi(mis) ≥ qi(mit) = qi(µi(β)) = q̃i(β).





Substituting ũi(xi) ≡ q̃i(xi)xi − t̃i(xi) and rearranging yields the expected payment
given in Proposition 1.2.
Proof of Proposition 1.3. Since there are Mi elements in the message spaceMi,
the range of µi(·) also consists of Mi elements. Thus, bidder’s type Xi can be parti-
tioned into Mi segments defined by Yi = (Yi0, Yi1, . . . , Yi,Mi−1) such that µi(α) = mj
where α ∈ Yij or, equivalently, Yij = µ−1i ({mj}). Let Yis and Yit be segments such
that µi(α) = mis and µi(β) = mit where α ∈ Yis and β ∈ Yit. The sufficient con-
dition for incentive compatibility is that if qi(mis) > qi(mit), any α ∈ Yis must be
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greater than all β ∈ Yit. The condition holds when each segment is convex. For any
i ∈ I and j = 0, 1, . . . ,Mi − 1, the partition is defined as x̂i,j−1 = inf Yij. We can
redefine q̃i(xi) as a step function {(x̂ik, q̃i(xik))}Mi−1k=0 .
Proof of Proposition 1.4. Consider xi ∈ [x̂ij, x̂i,j+1).












Since q̃i(z) is constant for z ∈ [x̂ij, xi],
∫ xi
x̂ij
q̃i(z)dz = qi(mij)(xi − x̂ij). Hence,



















(qi(mik)− qi(mi,k−1)) x̂ik − ui(xi)
Proof of Proposition 1.5. The probability of trade can be derived from the allo-
cation rule in Definition 1.5. Bidder i will win with message mj when (1) all other
bidders submit messages with lower priority or (2) some bidders submit the same
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message mj, other bidders submit messages with lower priority and bidder i wins
the tiebreaker. The probability that the former scenario happens is the first term.
For the latter scenario, the number of bidders who submit the same message mj
ranges from one to I − 1. Therefore, the second term is a sum of a probability that
bidder i wins the tiebreaker with k-way tie for k = 1, 2, . . . , I − 1. Therefore,





































I(F (x̂j)− F (x̂j−1))
·[
F (x̂j)
I − I(F (x̂j)− F (x̂j−1))F (x̂j−1)I−1 − F (x̂j−1)I
]
The expected payment is similar to the one in Proposition 1.4 except that the
messages’ subscript i’s are dropped.
Proof of Proposition 1.6. Since the expected gain from trade depends only on
a partition rule x̂, the number of bidders I and type space F . Proposition 1.6
immediately follows.
Proof of Proposition 1.7. In a mechanism with M messages, the social planner’s
problem is equivalent to the one in a mechanism with M + 1 messages and an
additional constraint, x̂iM = x̂i,M+1 = xi for all i ∈ I. An optimization problem
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with fewer constraints yields weakly higher maximum than otherwise. Therefore,
a mechanism with M + 1 messages yields higher efficiency than the one with M
messages.
Proof of Proposition 1.8. Differentiating the objective function with respect to
















F (x̂j+1)− F (x̂j)
+
x̂jf(x̂j)(F (x̂j)
I − F (x̂j−1)I)
F (x̂j)− F (x̂j−1)
− x̂jf(x̂j)(F (x̂j+1)
I − F (x̂j)I)
F (x̂j+1)− F (x̂j)
−
(F (x̂j)




(F (x̂j)− F (x̂j−1))2
+
(F (x̂j+1)




(F (x̂j+1)− F (x̂j))2
= 0




xdF (x) and λ(a, b) = F (b)
I−F (a)I
F (b)−F (a) yields
the first-order condition.
Proof of Corollary 1.1. Substituting F (x) = x into the first-order condition and



















F (x̂j+1)− F (x̂j−1)
∫ x̂j+1
x̂j−1
xdF (x) = E(x|x ∈ [x̂j−1, x̂j+1])
Proof of Corollary 1.3. That is, we will prove that pIj − pIj−1 > 0. So,





















































is strictly positive by construction and x̂jq(mj−1) − t(mj−1) >
x̂j−1q(mj−1)− t(mj−1) ≥ 0 by individual rationality condition, pIj − pIj−1 > 0.
The example that the efficient bid levels of the second-price auction are non-
unique is discussed in Section 1.4.3.
Proof of Proposition 1.9. We will prove that the equilibrium bidding strategy
is defined as follows: in round t with demand history ht, a bidder with valuation
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x ≥ x∗t (ht) bids whereas bidder with valuation x < x∗t (ht) drops out. Suppose all
bidders except bidder i follows this bidding strategy. This bidding strategy is an
equilibrium if it is optimal for bidder i to follow this bidding strategy as well. If
bidder i bid and all other bidders drop out, bidder i wins and pays pt(bid). If all
bidders drop out and bidder i wins the tiebreaker, bidder i pays pt(dropout). For
most pricing rules, pt(bid) ≥ pt(dropout). Define Πt(xi,ht) as bidder i’s expected
payoff if the auction continues to round t. For any incentive compatibility selling
mechanism, Πt(xi,ht) is increasing in xi.
In round t with demand history ht, Bidder i’s payoff of bidding can be written
as
πt(bid, xi,ht) = (xi − pt(bid))
(









F (x∗t (ht))− F (x∗t−1(ht−1))
)ht−1−k(
1− F (x∗t (ht))
)k
·Πt+1(xi,ht ∪ (k))






F (x∗t (ht))− F (x∗t−1(ht−1))
)ht
Bidder i’s bids if πt(bid, xi,ht) ≥ πt(dropout, xi,ht) and drops out otherwise. The
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gain from bidding can be defined as follows.
πt(bid, xi,ht)− πt(dropout, xi,ht)
= (xi − pt(bid))
(























xi + pt(dropout)− pt(bid)
)(









F (x∗t (ht))− F (x∗t−1(ht−1))
)ht−1−k (
1− F (x∗t (ht))
)k
·Πt+1(xi,ht ∪ (k))
Since πt(bid, xi,ht)− πt(dropout, xi,ht) is strictly increasing in xi, we can solve for
a critical valuation xi ≡ x∗t (ht) such that πt(bid, xi,ht)− πt(dropout, xi,ht) = 0. If
xi < x
∗
t (ht), πt(bid, xi,ht) − πt(dropout, xi,ht) < 0 and vice versa. Therefore, it is
optimal for bidder i to follow the proposed equilibrium strategy.
Proof of Proposition 1.10. We can implement an efficient partition rule in a
blind clock auction with a clock auction with demand disclosure. The expected
gain from trade in static auction ϕ(x̂) is equivalent to the one in dynamic auction
Φ(x∗) with additional constraints x∗t (ht) = x̂t for all ht ∈ Ht and t = 1, 2, . . . , P −1.
Relaxing these constraints yield higher value of the objective function. Thus, a clock
auction with demand disclosure is more efficient than the blind clock auction.
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Appendix B
Missing proofs from Chapter 2
Proof of Proposition 2.1. A bidder’s maximization problem is to choose an op-
timal exit bid. Consider bidder i with a valuation xi ∈ [Pt, Pt+1). Suppose that x̃
is the K-highest competing bid among bidders other than bidder i. First, it is a
weakly-dominated strategy to submit an exit bid x′ < xi. If x̃ ≤ x′ < xi, her payoff
is equal to the one when she bid her valuation. If x′ ≤ x̃ < xi, she loses and is better
off bidding her valuation. If x′ < xi ≤ x̃, she loses regardless. Hence, she cannot be
better off bidding x′ < xi. Second, it is also a weakly-dominated strategy to submit
an exit bid x′ > xi. If x̃ ≤ xi < x′, she receives the same payoff as submitting
an exit bid of xi. If xi < x̃ ≤ x′, she wins the item at price above her valuation
and receives a negative payoff. Finally, if xi < x
′ < x̃, she loses regardless. Thus,
she cannot gain by bidding x′ > xi. Therefore, it is a weakly-dominant strategy to
submit an exit bid equal to the bidder’s valuation.
Proof of Lemma 2.1. In round t > s + 1, the final price is at least Pt−1 which
exceeds bidder i’s valuation. Winning the item yields a strictly negative payoff
regardless of her rank so that she is better off losing. Thus, it is a weakly-dominant
strategy to exit immediately in round t to reduce a chance of winning the item if
she is a provisional winner or to avoid winning at all if she is a provisional loser.
Proof of Lemma 2.2. Consider a provisional loser who has a valuation less than
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the current clock price. Exiting immediately yields a payoff of zero while bidding
yields a positive expected payoff since she may win the item in the subsequent round
at a profitable price. Thus, a provisional loser will never exit before her valuation
is reached.
Next, consider a provisional loser i who has a valuation xi ∈ [Pt−1, Pt) in round
t. By remaining active, she may be able to win the item at Pt−1 if fewer than K− 2
bids in addition to her bid are submitted. However, bidding entails a risk of winning
at a price of Pt resulting in a negative payoff. According to Lemma 1, if she bids
in round t and the auction continues to round t + 1, she will exit regardless of her
rank. She will bid if the expected payoff of bidding—the expected payoff if she wins
at Pt−1 less the expected payoff if she wins at Pt—is positive.
She will win the item at Pt when (1) there are at least K − 1 bids submitted
in round t, (2) she is selected to be a provisional winner of rank L and (3) less than
L bids from provisional losers are submitted in round t+ 1. Let λit(m, r,Hit) be the
probability that m bidders out of r remaining bidders excluding bidder i stay active
in round t given a ranking history Hit and µit(m, r,Hit) be the probability that m
provisional losers out of r provisional losers bid in round t given a ranking history
Hit.

















µi,t+1(z, j −K + 1,Hit ∪ (L))
The first term is the expected payoff when less than K−2 bids are submitted.
The second term is the expected payoff when exactly K − 1 bids are submitted
and the provisional loser i wins the item at Pt. The third term is the expected
payoff when the auction continues to round t+1 and the provisional loser i wins the
item. The last two summations aggregate probabilities that bidder i is selected as a
provisional winner of rank L = 1, . . . , K and z = 0, . . . , L− 1 bids are submitted in
round t + 1. The first summation in the third term then aggregates over a chance
that at least K bids are submitted in round t+ 1.
Since Pt−1 ≤ xi < Pt and λit(m, r,Hit) ≥ 0, the first term is weakly positive
while the second and third terms are negative. For some ranking history, an expected
payoff when less than K − 2 bids are submitted is strictly positive. Because bidder
i’s valuation is closer to Pt, the first term is larger while the other two terms become
smaller and the expected payoff of bidding increases. By using an intermediate
valuation xi = Pt, the expected payoff of bidding is positive. So, if bidder i’s
valuation is sufficiently close to Pt, the expected payoff is positive and as a result,
bidding is profitable for bidder i.
Proof of Lemma 2.3. Consider a provisional winner i in round t with valuation
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xi ∈ [Pt, Pt+1). It is optimal to exit in round t if the expected payoff of exiting
exceeds the expected payoff of bidding. Using the same notations as in the proof of
Lemma 2, suppose there are R bidders remaining in round t and the ranking history
is Hit. Let l be a provisional winner i’s rank in round t. If her valuation is close to
Pt, she will exit in round t+ 1 since a negative expected payoff arising from winning
the item at an unprofitable price exceeds an expected payoff of exiting.



















µi,t+1(z, j −K + 1,Hit ∪ (L))
The left-hand side is the expected payoff if provisional winner i exits and less than
l bids are submitted. The first term of the right-hand side is the expected payoff if
provisional winner i bids and exactly K − 1 bids are submitted so that provisional
winner i gets the item at Pt. The second term of the right-hand side is the expected
payoff if fewer than K− 1 bids are submitted so that bidder i gets the item at Pt−1.
The last term is the expected payoff if at least K − 1 bids are submitted and the
auction continues to round t+ 1. Provisional winner i is selected to be a provisional
winner of rank L in round t + 1. She then exits and wins the item at Pt. Assume
for now that bidder i exits in round t + 1. Then, we use an intermediate valuation
Pt so that it is a dominant strategy for provisional winner i to exit in round t + 1.
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Also, let l = K as the provisional winner with rank K is most susceptible to exit.
Rearranging yields











µi,t+1(z, j −K + 1,Hit ∪ (L))
Because xi ∈ [Pt, Pt+1) and λit(m, r,Hit) ≥ 0 for any m, r and Hit, both sides of
the inequality are positive. For some ranking history, the probability that K − 1
bids are submitted in round t is strictly positive so that the left-hand side is strictly
positive as well. As provisional winner i’s valuation is closer to Pt, the left-hand
side is larger while the right-hand side becomes smaller. By using an intermediate
valuation, xi = Pt, the inequality holds. That is, the expected payoff of exiting
exceeds that of bidding.
Proof of Proposition 2.2. According to Lemma 2.2 and 2.3, provisional losers
may bid above their valuations and provisional winners may exit before their val-
uations are reached. For some ranking history and valuation, a bidder may bid if
she is a provisional loser but she may exit if she is a provisional winner. Such an
asymmetric bidding strategy leads to an inefficient allocation.
Proof of Lemma 2.4. In the one-item case, the final price is equal to the highest
bid. Regardless of her rank, a bidder with a valuation xi < Pt cannot profitably bid
in round t since the final price will be at least Pt. Therefore, bidding above one’s
valuation is a weakly-dominated strategy.
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If a bidder with valuation xi ≥ Pt is a provisional loser in round t, it is a
weakly-dominated strategy to exit since exiting yields a payoff of zero while bidding
may give her a chance to win at a profitable price. Hence, the optimal strategy for
a provisional loser is straightforward bidding.
Proof of Lemma 2.5. To show this, consider a provisional winner with valuation
xi in round t. Let λt(Hit) be a probability that the opponent bids in round t given
a ranking history Hit and Πi,t+1(xi,Hit) be an expected payoff in round t+ 1 given
a valuation xi and a ranking history Hit. Note that Πi,t+1(xi,Hit) is increasing in
xi. A provisional winner’s expected gain from exiting in round t is given by
Git(xi,Hit) ≡ (xi − Pt−1)λt(Hit)− (xi − Pt)λt(Hit)− Πi,t+1(xi,Hit)
= (Pt − Pt−1)λt(Hit)− Πi,t+1(xi,Hit)
Because the first term does not depend on xi and the second term is decreasing in
xi, the gain from exiting is decreasing in xi as well.
Proof of Proposition 2.3. Weakly-dominant strategies are defined in Lemmas
2.4 and 2.5.
Proof of Lemma 2.6. We will show that in any round t ≤ s − 2 a provisional
winner will bid even in the scenario which is the most susceptible to bid shading.
Suppose bidder i with a valuation xi ∈ [Pt, Pt+1) is a provisional winner in round
t− 2. Consider a scenario that is most susceptible to bid shading—(1) bidder i has
the lowest valuation, xi = Pt, (2) it is profitable to exit in round t−1 given a ranking
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history and (3) the lower bound of her opponent’s valuation is the lowest; that is,
the ranking history implies that x̂t−2(Hi,t−2) = Pt−3. Let Πit(xi,Hit) be bidder i’s
expected payoff in round t. Her gain from exiting in round t− 2 is
Gi,t−2(xi,Hi,t−2) = (xi − Pt−3)
F (Pt−2)− F (Pt−3)
1− F (Pt−3)
− (xi − Pt−2)






















The first term is the payoff of exiting when the opponent also exits in round t− 2.
The expected payoff of bidding consists of the last three terms. The second term
is a payoff of bidding when the opponent exits in round t − 2. The third term is a
payoff when the opponent bids in round t − 2, bidder i is selected as a provisional
winner in round t − 1 and the opponent exits in round t − 1. Since Πit(xi,Hit) is
strictly positive, the gain from exiting in round t− 2 is negative.
Since a provisional winner i with a valuation xi − Pt bids in round t − 2,
according to Lemma 5, any provisional winner with a valuation xi > Pt stays active.
In other words, a provisional winner in round t−2 with a valuation x ∈ [Pt+j, Pt+j+1)
for j = 0, 1, . . . , T − t−2 or equivalently, a provisional winner in round s = t−2− j
with a valuation x ∈ [Pt, Pt+1) for j = 0, 1, . . . , t− 3, will bid as well.
Proof of Proposition 2.4. Since the amount of bid shading is limited to only two
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bid levels according to Lemma 2.6, the absolute amount of bid shading shrinks as
the bid increments become smaller. Moreover, the finer bid increments allow bidders
to better express the value differences. Hence, the efficiency in the LAB auction is
higher by reducing bid increments.
Proof of Lemma 2.7. We have to calculate a probability that the final price is Pt
for t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1. For t > 0, there are two possible cases: (1) both bidders
have valuations in [Pt, Pt+1) and (2) one bidder has a valuation in [Pt, Pt+1) and the
other bidder has a valuation in [Pt, 1]. The final price is P0 only if both bidders have
valuations in [P0, P1). Thus, the expected revenue is
RSBLAB = P0
(













F (Pt)− F (Pt−1)
)]
=
(T − 2)(2T + 3)
6(T − 1)2
Proof of Lemma 2.8. The maximum shading strategies are given as follows. A
provisional winner does not infer the opponent’s valuation from the ranking history.
That is, in any round t, she maximizes her payoff given that the opponent has a




t ≥ 2 and for any Hi,t−1 ∈ Θt−1. If the final price is Pt , there are three possible
combinations of bids determining the final price: (1) only a provisional winner exits
in round t, (2) only a provisional loser exits in round t and (3) both of them exit
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Table B.1: Possible scenarios in which the final price is Pt for t =
3, 4, . . . , T − 4
Ranking history Valuation Exiting bidder
Provisional winner Provisional loser
(Ri,t−3, Ri,t−2, Ri,t−1, Rit) = (1, 1, 1, 1) [Pt + 2∆/5, Pt+1 + 2∆/5) [Pt, 1] Proviosional winner
(Ri,t−3, Ri,t−2, Ri,t−1, Rit) = (1, 1, 1, 1) [Pt + 2∆/5, 1] [Pt−1, Pt) Proviosional loser
(Ri,t−3, Ri,t−2, Ri,t−1, Rit) = (1, 0, 1, 1) [Pt−1 + 2∆/5, Pt+1 + 2∆/5) [Pt + 2∆/5, 1] Proviosional winner
(Ri,t−3, Ri,t−2, Ri,t−1, Rit) = (0, 1, 1, 1) [Pt + 2∆/5, Pt+1 + 2∆/5) [Pt, 1] Proviosional winner
(Ri,t−3, Ri,t−2, Ri,t−1, Rit) = (0, 1, 1, 1) [Pt+1 + 2∆/5, 1] [Pt−1, Pt+1 + 2∆/5) Proviosional loser
(Ri,t−3, Ri,t−2, Ri,t−1, Rit) = (0, 0, 1, 1) [Pt−1, Pt+1 + 2∆/5) [Pt + 2∆/5, 1] Proviosional winner
(Ri,t−2, Ri,t−1, Rit, Ri,t+1) = (1, 1, 1, 1) [Pt+1 + 2∆/5, Pt+2 + 2∆/5) [Pt, Pt+1) Both
(Ri,t−2, Ri,t−1, Rit, Ri,t+1) = (0, 0, 1, 1) [Pt+1 + 2∆/5, Pt+2 + 2∆/5) [Pt + 2∆/5, Pt+1) Both
in round t + 1. Since a provisional winner never shades more than two bid levels
below her valuation, a ranking history of only three rounds before the final round is
relevant. Suppose bidder i is a provisional winner at the final round. Hence, there
are eight possible cases with a final price of Pt for t = 3, 4, . . . , T − 4 as shown in
Table B.1.
We have to calculate a probability that the auction ends at P0, P1, P2, PT−3
and PT−2 separately because their associated probabilities are different as shown in
Table B.2.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































auction with maximum shading strategy as






















































∆(1− t∆) + ∆(1− (t+ 1)∆− 2
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+ (1− (T − 2)∆) · 3
5




Replacing ∆ = 1
T−1 and Pt =
t
T−1 with some manipulation yields the expected
revenue in Lemma 2.8.
Proof of Proposition 2.5. According to Lemma 2.7 and 2.8, the lower bound and
upper bound of the expected revenue converge to 1/3. The expected revenue of the
LAB auction converges to 1/3 as well.
Proof of Lemma 2.9. The calculation is similar to the proof of Lemma 8 with
x̂t−1(Hi,t−1) = Pt +
2(1−α)
5(1+α)
for any t ≥ 2 and for any Hi,t−1 ∈ Θt−1 instead.
Proof of Proposition 2.6. Using the lower bound defined in Lemma 2.9 we solve
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for α ∈ [0, 1) such that R̃MSLAB(T, α) ≥ 1/3.
Proof of Proposition 2.7. The equilibrium bidding function is solved in the Sec-
tion 2.9. The next step is to prove that if the optimal exit bid is higher than the
current clock price, it is optimal to bid at the current clock price. Consider a bidder
with a valuation x who bids as if he has a valuation x′. His payoff function is
πt(x









′, x,Mt) = (1 + α)(x−Bt(x′, α,Mt))g(x′|zt)−B′t(x′, α,Mt)G(x′|zt)
= (1 + α)(x− x′)g(x′|zt) + (1 + α)(x′ −Bt(x′, α,Mt))g(x′|zt)
−B′t(x′, α,Mt)G(x′|zt)
= (1 + α)(x− x′)g(x′|zt)
Consider a bidder with valuation x such that Bt(x, α,Mt) > Pt. She is constrained
to bid either at the current clock price or submit and an exit bid between Pt−1 and
Pt. Since πt(x
′, x,Mt) is increasing for all x
′ < x, it is optimal to bid at the current
clock price.
Proof of Proposition 2.8. According to Proposition 2.7, the bidding strategy is
symmetric and monotonic in valuation; thus, the LABx auction is efficient.
Proof of Proposition 2.9. In the HRB and LABx auctions, the allocation rules
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and expected payoffs of the lowest-valuation bidder are the same. Furthermore,
their payoff functions are the same when α = 0. Thus, revenue equivalence holds.
Since bidders shade their bids in the LABx auction, fear of losing therefore
impacts the bidding strategy. In contrast, bidders bid truthfully in the HRB auction
so that the strategy is not affected by fear of losing. As the exit bid function is
increasing in α, the expected revenue of the LABx auction is increasing in α as
well.
Solving for the equilibrium with the uniform distribution, fixed incre-
ment and four bid levels
In this section, define πit(xi, qit,Hit) as bidder i’s expected payoff if she submits
qit ∈ {0, 1} given bidder i’s ranking history Hit. Note that we can omit the other
bidder’s ranking history because it is the complement of bidder i’s ranking history.
We will solve for the bidding strategy of the bidder with the lowest valuation first.
First, consider a bidder i with valuation xi ∈ [P0, P1). If she is a provisional
winner in round 1, according to Lemma 2.3, she will exit in round 1.
Next, consider a bidder i with valuation xi ∈ [P1, P2). If she is a provisional
winner in round 2, she will exit. When she is a provisional winner in round 1, she
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will exit as well since
πi1(xi, 0, (1)) = (xi − P0)
F (P1)− F (P0)
1− F (P0)
= (xi − P0)∆
> πi1(xi, 1, (1)) = (xi − P1)












Finally, consider a bidder i with valuation xi ∈ [P2, P3]. If she is a provisional
winner in round 3, she will exit. When she is a provisional winner in round 2 and
Hi2 = (1, 1) which implies that the opponent has a valuation in [P1, 1], she will exit
since
πi2(xi, 0, (1, 1)) = (xi − P1)
F (P2)− F (P1)
1− F (P1)
= (xi − P1)
∆
1− F (P1)
> πi2(xi, 1, (1, 1)) = (xi − P2)














If she is a provisional winner in round 2 and Hi2 = (0, 1), then the opponent has a
valuation greater than P2 and thus the opponent will bid according to Lemma 2.4.
Therefore, the provisional winner will also bid in round 2.




solving πi1(x̂, 0, (1)) = πi1(x̂, 1, (1)).
To calculate the expected revenue, we consider all possible realizations of val-
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Table B.3: Possible outcomes for all realizations in round 1 and H11 = (1)
Bidder 1’s value Bidder 2’s value





[P0, P1) P0 P1 P1 P1
[P1, P2) P0 P1 P1 P1
[P2, P2 +
2
5∆) P0 P1 P1 P1
[P2 +
2
5∆, P3] P1 Continue Continue Continue
Table B.4: Possible outcomes for all realizations in round 2 and H12 =
(1, 1)
Bidder 1’s value Bidder 2’s value





[P0, P1) - - - -
[P1, P2) - - - -
[P2, P2 +
2
5∆) - - - -
[P2 +
2
5∆, P3] - P1 P2 P2
uations and outcomes as shown in Tables B.3 to B.5. Outcomes when ranking
histories are H11 = (0), H12 = (0, 0) and H12 = (0, 1) are similar to Tables B.3 to




































Substituting Pt = t/3 and ∆ = 1/3 yields an expected revenue of 0.2778.
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Table B.5: Possible outcomes for all realizations in round 2 and H12 =
(1, 0)
Bidder 1’s value Bidder 2’s value





[P0, P1) - - - -
[P1, P2) - - - -
[P2, P2 +
2
5∆) - - - -
[P2 +
2






Welcome to the auction experiment. In this experiment, you will participate
in auctions as a bidder. The precise rules and procedures that govern the operation
of these auctions will be explained to you below.
Various research foundations have provided funds for this research. The in-
structions are simple, and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you
can finish the experiment with a considerable amount of money, which will be paid
to you in cash at the end. The experiment will last about 80 minutes.
The type of currency used in this experiment is Experimental Currency Units
(ECU). Participants completing the session do not risk losing any money. At the
end of the experiment all your earnings will be converted to US Dollars. The con-
version rate is 10 ECU = 1 US Dollar. You will be paid in cash when you finish
the experiment. The more ECU you earn, the more US Dollars you earn. If you
participate in this experiment until the session is over, then you will be paid an
additional 5 US Dollars.
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Auction Rules and Calculation of Earnings
You will be participating in 20 auctions. At the beginning of the first auction,
you will be randomly matched with another participant in this room; every auction,
you will be randomly re-matched with a different participant. In each auction you
will be bidding against the participant with whom you are matched.
In a given auction, there is a fictitious good that is sold and you will be a
bidder in this auction. When the first auction starts, you will observe your value of
the fictitious good. Your value is a number between 50 and 100 and it is randomly
selected from the [50,100] interval with equal probability and rounded to the nearest
cent. The other bidder participating in this auction also receives his or her inde-
pendent value for the fictitious good and his or her value is also randomly selected
from [50,100] interval. Each bidder will know only his or her own value.
The price for the fictitious good will start at 50 and will gradually increase to
60, 70, 80, 90, and 100. At price level 50, both you and your opponent are in the
auction. The computer will ask you if you would like to stay in the auction when
the price increases to 60. You either stay IN which indicates that you are willing
to pay 60 for the good or you stay OUT. If you stay out for at a price of 60, you
need to enter an exit bid which must be an amount between 50 and 60. The exit
bid is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay for the good. For example,
if you stay out and indicate that your exit bid is 54, then it means you would be
willing to pay at most 54 for the good. The exit bid has to be an amount between
the previous price level and the current price at which you are staying out. There
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are four possible things that can happen:
• You stay IN, and your opponent stays OUT with an exit bid of, say, 55: Then
you win the fictitious good and pay 55, your opponent’s exit bid.
• You stay OUT with exit bid of, say 57, and your opponent stays IN: Then
your opponent wins the fictitious good and pays 57, your exit bid.
• You stay OUT, your opponent stays OUT: Then the bidder who submitted
the highest exit bid wins the fictitious good and pays the smaller of the exit
bids.
• You stay IN, your opponent stays IN: Then the price moves to the next level
which is 70.
If both you and your opponent stay in the auction for price level 60, then the
computer will ask if you would like to stay in the auction when the price increases
to 70. Again there are four possible things that can happen:
• You stay IN, and your opponent stays OUT with exit bid of, say, 65: Then
you win the fictitious good and pay 65, your opponent’s exit bid.
• You stay OUT with exit bid of, say 67, and your opponent stays IN: Then
your opponent wins the fictitious good and pays 67, your exit bid.
• You stay OUT, your opponent stays OUT: Then the bidder who submitted
the highest exit bid wins the fictitious good and pays the smaller of the exit
bids.
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• You stay IN, your opponent stays IN: Then the price moves to the next level
which is 80.
If both you and your opponent stay in the auction for price level 70, then the
computer will ask if you would like to stay in the auction at a price of 80.
The same procedure will repeat for price levels of 90 and 100. If both of you
are still in the auction when the price level is 100, then the computer will randomly
assign the fictitious good to one of the bidders with equal chance and that bidder
will pay 100.
Please note that the price level increases only if both bidders stay in the
auction. If only one bidder stays in and the other one stays out with an exit bid,
the bidder who is in wins the good and pays the exit bid of the other bidder.
Otherwise, if both bidders stay out then the one with the higher exit bid wins the
good and pays the exit bid of the other bidder. For example, when the price level
is 70, if you indicate to stay OUT with exit bid of 63, and your opponent indicates
to stay OUT with exit bid of 67, then your opponent wins the good (he or she has
the higher exit bid) and pays 63 (which is the smaller exit bid). If you both submit
the same exit bid while staying out then, the computer randomly assigns the good
to one of the bidders, and the winner pays the exit bid of the other.
When one bidder wins the good, the auction is over. If you are the winner at
a certain price, then you earn the difference between your value and the price. For
example, let us say you have a value of 82.55 for the fictitious good in the current
auction and you win the good at a price of 61. Then your earning from this round
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is
Earning = 82.55 - 61 = 21.55 ECU
When the first auction is completed, the second auction will start. At the
beginning of the second auction, you will be randomly matched with another par-
ticipant in this room and play with that person in this round. First, the computer
will show you your new value for the good for this auction. It is again a randomly
selected number from [50,100] interval. Your opponent will also observe his or her
own value for the good for this auction privately. The same auction rules as in the
first auction will apply. There are 20 auctions in total. The computer will sum up
your earnings in ECU in all auctions and convert this amount to the US Dollars by
dividing by 10. We will pay you this amount in cash at the end of the experiment
in person.
In order to make sure that you understand the rules of the auction, we have
a test period before the real session starts. In this test period, you will see some
multiple choice questions about the auction rules. Please answer those questions to
the best of your knowledge. You may look at the hard copy of the instructions while
answering them. Once you answer all the questions correctly, one practice auction
will be conducted for which no payment will be made. Then the experiment will
start with 20 real auctions.
Please ask if you have any questions.
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Questions for the test period (asked to the subjects during the test
period by the computer)
1) The price level just moved from 60 to 70 and the computer asks you if you
would like to stay in at a price of 70. You said that you are IN and your opponent
said that he or she is OUT with an exit bid of 65. Then what would be the
outcome of the auction?
a) You would win the good and pay 60.
b) Your opponent would win the good and pay 70.
c) You would win the good and pay 65.
d) Nobody would win the good and the price would move to 80.
Answer: (c)
2) The price level just moved from 70 to 80 and the computer asks you if you
would like to stay in for price level 80. You decided to stay OUT for price level of
80. What are the possible exit bids you may enter?
a) Any amount between 65 and 70.
b) Any amount between 70 and 80.
c) Any amount between 60 and 70.
d) Any amount between 80 and 90.
Answer: (b)
3) Let us say, your value of the good is 91 for the current round. The price level
just moved from 70 to 80 and the computer asks you if you would like to stay in
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for price level 80. You said that you are OUT with an exit bid of 77 and your
opponent said that he or she is OUT with an exit bid of 74. Then what would be
your and your opponent’s earnings for this round?
a) You would win the good and pay 77. You would earn 14 and your opponent
would earn 0.
b) Your opponent would win the good and pay 74. You would earn 0 and you
cannot know your opponent’s earning without knowing his or her value.
c) You would win the good and pay 80. You would earn 11 and your opponent
would earn 0.





Welcome to the auction experiment. In this experiment, you will participate
in auctions as a bidder. The precise rules and procedures that govern the operation
of these auctions will be explained to you below.
Various research foundations have provided funds for this research. The in-
structions are simple, and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you
can finish the experiment with a considerable amount of money, which will be paid
to you in cash at the end. The experiment will last about 80 minutes.
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The type of currency used in this experiment is Experimental Currency Units
(ECU). Participants completing the session do not risk losing any money. At the
end of the experiment all your earnings will be converted to US Dollars. The con-
version rate is 10 ECU = 1 US Dollar. You will be paid in cash when you finish
the experiment. The more ECU you earn, the more US Dollars you earn. If you
participate in this experiment until the session is over, then you will be paid an
additional 5 US Dollars.
Auction Rules and Calculation of Earnings
You will be participating in 20 auctions. At the beginning of the first auction,
you will be randomly matched with another participant in this room; every auction,
you will be randomly re-matched with a different participant. In each auction you
will be bidding against the participant with whom you are matched.
In a given auction, there is a fictitious good that is sold and you will be
a bidder in this auction.. When the first auction starts, you will observe your
value of the fictitious good. Your value is a number between 50 and 100 and it is
randomly selected from the [50,100] interval with equal probability and rounded to
the nearest cent. The other bidder participating in this auction also receives his or
her independent value for the fictitious good and his or her value is also randomly
selected from [50,100] interval. Each bidder will know only his or her own value.
The price for the fictitious good will start at 50 and will gradually increase to
60, 70, 80, 90, and 100. At price level 50, both you and your opponent are in the
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auction. The computer will ask you if you would like to stay in the auction when
the price increases to 60. You either stay IN which indicates that you are willing
to pay 60 for the good or you stay OUT. If you stay out at a price of 60, you need
to enter an exit bid which must be an amount between 50 and 60. The exit bid is
the maximum amount that you are willing to pay for the good. For example, if you
stay out and indicate that your exit bid is 54, then it means you would be willing
to pay at most 54 for the good. The exit bid has to be an amount between the
previous price level and the current price at which you are staying out. There are
four possible things that can happen:
• You stay IN, and your opponent stays OUT: Then you win the fictitious good
and pay 60.
• You stay OUT, and your opponent stays IN: Then your opponent wins the
fictitious good and pays 60.
• You stay OUT, your opponent stays OUT: Then the bidder who submitted
the highest exit bid wins the fictitious good and pays his or her exit bid.
• You stay IN, your opponent stays IN: Then the price moves to the next level
which is 70.
If both you and your opponent stay in the auction for price level 60, then the
computer will ask if you would like to stay in the auction when the price increases
to 70. Again there are four possible things that can happen:
• You stay IN, and your opponent stays OUT: Then you win the fictitious good
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and pay 70.
• You stay OUT, and your opponent stays IN: Then your opponent wins the
fictitious good and pays 70.
• You stay OUT, your opponent stays OUT: Then the bidder who submitted
the highest exit bid wins the fictitious good and pays his or her exit bid.
• You stay IN, your opponent stays IN: Then the price moves to the next level
which is 80.
If both you and your opponent stay in the auction for price level 70, then the
computer will ask if you would like to stay in the auction at a price of 80.
The same procedure will repeat for price levels of 90 and 100. If both of you
are still in the auction when the price level is 100, then the computer will randomly
assign the fictitious good to one of the bidders with equal chance and that bidder
will pay 100.
Please note that the price level increases only if both bidders stay in the
auction. If only one bidder stays in and the other one stays out, the bidder who
is in wins the good and pays the price for which he or she indicated to stay in.
Otherwise, if both bidders stay out then the one with the higher exit bid wins the
good and pays his or her exit bid. For example, when the price level is 70, if you
indicate to stay OUT with exit bid of 63, and your opponent indicates to stay OUT
with exit bid of 67, then your opponent wins the good (he or she has the higher exit
bid) and pays 67 (his or her exit bid). If you both submit the same exit bid while
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staying out then, the computer randomly assigns the good to one of the bidders,
and the winner pays his or her exit bid.
When one bidder wins the good, the auction is over. If you are the winner at
a certain price, then you earn the difference between your value and the price. For
example, let us say you have a value of 82.55 for the fictitious good in the current
auction and you win the good at a price of 61. Then your earning from this round
is
Earning = 82.55 - 61 = 21.55 ECU
When the first auction is completed, the second auction will start. At the
beginning of the second auction, you will be randomly matched with another par-
ticipant in this room and play with that person in this round. First, the computer
will show you your new value for the good for this auction. It is again a randomly
selected number from [50,100] interval. Your opponent will also observe his or her
own value for the good for this auction privately. The same auction rules as in the
first auction will apply. There are 20 auctions in total. The computer will sum up
your earnings in ECU in all auctions and convert this amount to the US Dollars by
dividing by 10. We will pay you this amount in cash at the end of the experiment
in person.
In order to make sure that you understand the rules of the auction, we have
a test period before the real session starts. In this test period, you will see some
multiple choice questions about the auction rules. Please answer those questions to
the best of your knowledge. You may look at the hard copy of the instructions while
answering them. Once you answer all the questions correctly, one practice auction
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will be conducted for which no payment will be made. Then the experiment will
start with 20 real auctions.
Please ask if you have any questions.
Questions for the test period (asked to the subjects during the test
period by the computer)
1) The price level just moved from 60 to 70 and the computer asks you if you
would like to stay in at a price of 70. You said that you are IN and your opponent
said that he or she is OUT with an exit bid of 65. Then what would be the
outcome of the auction?
a) You would win the good and pay 70.
b) Your opponent would win the good and pay 70.
c) You would win the good and pay 65.
d) Nobody would win the good and the price would move to 80.
Answer: (a)
2) The price level just moved from 70 to 80 and the computer asks you if you
would like to stay in for price level 80. You decided to stay OUT for price level of
80. What are the possible exit bids you may enter?
a) Any amount between 65 and 70.
b) Any amount between 70 and 80.
c) Any amount between 60 and 70.
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d) Any amount between 80 and 90.
Answer: (b)
3) Let us say, your value of the good is 91 for the current round. The price level
just moved from 70 to 80 and the computer asks you if you would like to stay in
for price level 80. You said that you are OUT with an exit bid of 77 and your
opponent said that he or she is OUT with an exit bid of 74. Then what would be
your and your opponent’s earnings for this round?
a) You would win the good and pay 77. You would earn 14 and your opponent
would earn 0.
b) Your opponent would win the good and pay 74. You would earn 0 and you
cannot know your opponent’s earning without knowing his or her value.
c) You would win the good and pay 80. You would earn 11 and your opponent
would earn 0.





Welcome to the auction experiment. In this experiment, you will participate
in auctions as a bidder. The precise rules and procedures that govern the operation
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of these auctions will be explained to you below.
Various research foundations have provided funds for this research. The in-
structions are simple, and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you
can finish the experiment with a considerable amount of money, which will be paid
to you in cash at the end. The experiment will last about 80 minutes.
The type of currency used in this experiment is Experimental Currency Units
(ECU). Participants completing the session do not risk losing any money. At the
end of the experiment all your earnings will be converted to US Dollars. The con-
version rate is 10 ECU = 1 US Dollar. You will be paid in cash when you finish
the experiment. The more ECU you earn, the more US Dollars you earn. If you
participate in this experiment until the session is over, then you will be paid an
additional 5 US Dollars.
Auction Rules and Calculation of Earnings
You will be participating in 20 auctions. At the beginning of the first auction,
you will be randomly matched with another participant in this room; every auction,
you will be randomly re-matched with a different participant. In each auction you
will be bidding against the participant with whom you are matched.
In a given auction, there is a fictitious good that is sold and you will be
a bidder in this auction.. When the first auction starts, you will observe your
value of the fictitious good. Your value is a number between 50 and 100 and it is
randomly selected from the [50,100] interval with equal probability and rounded to
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the nearest cent. The other bidder participating in this auction also receives his or
her independent value for the fictitious good and his or her value is also randomly
selected from [50,100] interval. Each bidder will know only his or her own value.
The price for the fictitious good will start at 50 and will gradually increase to
60, 70, 80, 90, and 100. At price level 50, both you and your opponent are in the
auction. Then the computer will randomly determine one of you as a provisional
winner. Each bidder has 50% chance of being a provisional winner. Next, the
computer will ask you if you would like to stay in the auction when the price increases
to 60. There are four possible things that can happen:
• You stay IN, your opponent stays OUT: Then you win the fictitious good and
pay 60.
• You stay OUT, your opponent stays IN: Then your opponent wins the fictitious
good and pays 60.
• You stay OUT, your opponent stays OUT: Then the provisional winner wins
the fictitious good and pays 50.
• You stay IN, your opponent stays IN: Then the price moves to the next level
which is 70.
If both you and your opponent stay in the auction for price level 60, then the
computer will randomly determine a new provisional winner and ask if you would
like to stay in the auction when the price increases to 70. Again there are four
possible things that can happen:
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• You stay IN, your opponent stays OUT: Then you win the fictitious good and
pay 70.
• You stay OUT, your opponent stays IN: Then your opponent wins the fictitious
good and pays 70.
• You stay OUT, your opponent stays OUT: Then the provisional winner wins
the fictitious good and pays 60.
• You stay IN, your opponent stays IN: Then the price moves to the next level
which is 80.
If both you and your opponent stay in the auction for price level 70, then the
computer will randomly determine a new provisional winner and ask if you would
like to stay in the auction when price increases to 80.
The same procedure will repeat for price levels 90 and 100. If both of you are
still in the auction when the price level is 100, then the computer will randomly
assign the fictitious good to one of the bidders with equal chance, and the winner
will pay 100. Please note that the price level only increases if both bidders stay
in the auction. Each time the price level increases a new provisional winner is
randomly determined by the computer and each bidder has equal chance of being
the provisional winner at that price level. The provisional winner wins the fictitious
good at the previous price level if both bidders stay OUT at the current price level.
Otherwise, if one bidder stays in and the other bidder stays out in the current
round, then the bidder who is IN wins the good at the current price, regardless of
the provisional winner designation.
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When one bidder wins the good, the auction is over. If you are the winner at
a given price, then you earn the difference between your value and the price. For
example, let us say you have a value of 82.55 for the fictitious good in the current
auction and you win the good at a price of 60. Then your earning from this round
is
Earning = 82.55 - 60 = 22.55 ECU
When the first auction is completed, the second auction will start. At the
beginning of the second auction, you will be randomly matched with another par-
ticipant in this room and play with that person in this auction. First, the computer
will show you your new value for the good for this auction. It is again a randomly
selected number from [50,100] interval. Your opponent will also observe his or her
own value of the good for this auction privately. The same auction rules as in the
first auction will apply. There are 20 auctions in total. The computer will sum
up your earnings in ECU in all auctions and convert this amount to US Dollars by
dividing by 10. We will pay you this amount in cash at the end of the experiment
in person.
In order to make sure that you understand the rules of the auction, we have
a test period before the real session starts. In this test period, you will see some
multiple choice questions about the auction rules. Please answer those questions to
the best of your knowledge. You may look at the hard copy of the instructions while
answering them. Once you answer all the questions correctly, one practice auction
will be conducted for which no payment will be made. Then the experiment will
start with 20 real auctions.
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Please ask if you have any questions.
Questions for the test period (asked to the subjects during the test
period by the computer)
1) The price level just moved from 60 to 70 and the computer determined you as
the provisional winner for the current price. The computer asks you if you would
like to stay in for price level 70. You said that you are IN and your opponent said
that he or she is OUT. Then what would be the outcome of the auction?
a) Your opponent would win the good and pay 70.
b) You would win the good and pay 70.
c) You would win the good and pay 60.
d) Nobody would win the good and the price would move to 80.
Answer: (b)
2) The price level just moved from 60 to 70 and the computer determined your
opponent as the provisional winner for the current price. The computer asks you if
you would like to stay in for price level 70. You said that you are OUT and your
opponent said that he or she is OUT. Then what would be the outcome of the
auction?
a) You would win the good and pay 70.
b) Your opponent would win the good and pay 70.
c) You would win the good and pay 60.
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d) Your opponent would win the good and pay 60.
Answer: (d)
3) Your value of the good is 91 for the current auction. The price level just moved
from 70 to 80 and the computer determined you as the provisional winner for the
current price. The computer asks you if you would like to stay in for price level 80.
You said that you are OUT and your opponent said that he or she is OUT. Then
what would be your and your opponent’s earnings for this auction?
a) You would win the good and pay 70. You would earn 21 and your opponent
would earn 0.
b) Your opponent would win the good and pay 70. You would earn 0 and you
cannot know your opponent’s earning without knowing his or her value.
c) You would win the good and pay 80. You would earn 11 and your opponent
would earn 0.
d) Your opponent would win the good and pay 80. You would earn 0 and your
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